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Chapter 1
Introduction
"Interdependence is and ought to be as much the ideal of man as self-su¢ ciency.
Man is a social being." Mohandas K. Gandhi (1929)
A central theme in personnel economics is the misalignment of the goals of em-
ployees and those of the organization that employs them. In case the required
actions are impossible or costly to verify, this misalignment gives rise to the well-
known problem of moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979). Organizations have to ensure
that it becomes in the employees best interest to work towards the goals of the
organization. A widely studied means of achieving this goal alignment is making an
employees income contingent on objectives set by the employer; e.g., a piece rate,
an annual bonus depending on performance, or a promotion to reward outstanding
behavior over a longer period of time. There is compelling evidence that these -
nancial incentives increase employee productivity (see Prendergast 1999 and Lazear
and Oyer 2009 for an overview).
While nancial rewards can be a powerful tool to promote alignment, it is by
no means always the only, or most e¢ cient, option to motivate employees. Some
organizations can provide employees with other highly valued job aspects, such as
intrinsically rewarding work (Delfgaauw 2007), social inclusion, or an inspiring boss
(Dur et al. 2010). Moreover, neither nancial incentives nor non-monetary rewards
should be studied in a vacuum, as important interaction e¤ects may occur. In
this thesis, I study how di¤erent workplace practices inuence, and are inuenced
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by, interpersonal relationships between colleagues. By enriching economic theory
in this direction I aim to increase the understanding of organizational design and
human behavior in organizations. Further, this thesis may o¤er organizations some
lessons in their quest to optimize human resource practices.
This thesis presents two theoretical chapters and two chapters that describe the
results of eld experiments. I provide theoretical investigations into the interac-
tion between nancial incentives and co-worker relations using principal-multi-agent
models. Principal-multi-agent models capture the strategic interaction between an
organization and its employees (such as the moral hazard problem described above),
and allow for a formalization of interpersonal relationships between colleagues. Fur-
ther, I present the results of two eld experiments on the e¤ects of team incentives.
Empirical evidence for interaction e¤ects between nancial incentives and co-worker
relations is di¢ cult to obtain, because it is hard to establish causality with naturally
occurring data. For example, when we observe a positive correlation between the
quality of co-worker relations and the use of team incentives, it is unclear whether
good co-worker relations are a determinant for the use team incentives or a result of
it. Field experiments circumvent this problem of reverse causality by randomization.
This introduction proceeds as follows: The importance of co-worker relations is
motivated in Section 1.1. I will provide a more general discussion of the merits and
caveats of eld experiments in Section 1.2. The introduction ends with an overview
of the di¤erent chapters in Section 1.3.
1.1 Co-worker Relations
Most organizations actively promote social interaction among their personnel; ex-
amples range from the facilitation of co¤ee corners to o¤ering joint holiday trips
(e.g., Rohlen 1975, Cohen and Prusak 2001). There are two main reasons for rms
to invest in social interaction between colleagues: First, productivity may be higher
when employees have good relations on the workoor. Second, there may be a
compensating wage di¤erential for good co-worker relations, i.e., employees may be
willing to accept lower wages in workplaces with a more pleasant atmosphere.
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The belief that co-worker relations can be of value to an organization is shared
among managers. A survey among managers in the public sector in the US revealed
that close to 85% of managers state that their organization actively promotes friend-
ships between colleagues (Berman et al. 2002). These managers observe higher
productivity in workplaces where friendships were stimulated. However, evidence
for a direct relationship between group cohesiveness and productivity is inconclusive
(see the studies discussed in Rotemberg 2006). Co-worker relations are found to be
directly related to other important measures; co-worker relations are positively cor-
related with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, while they are negatively
related to employee stress, absenteeism, and turnover (see Price and Mueller 1981,
Riordan and Gri¤eth 1995, Nielsen et al. 2000, and Morrison 2004, among other
studies mentioned in Chapter 2).
Facilitation of social interaction among colleagues makes rms more attractive
as an employer for many (potential) workers. The anticipated interaction with col-
leagues is one of the main drivers for job search among Dutch unemployed (Van
Echtelt and Ho¤ 2008). Besides this, retired workers state that the social interac-
tion with colleagues is one of the most missed job aspects (Shacklock 2005). Finally,
detailed time-use data from both France and the US illustrate that employees are
more satised and in a better mood, when their job involves more frequent inter-
action with colleagues (Krueger and Schkade 2009). The theory of equalizing dif-
ferences (Rosen 1986) predicts that workplaces that have better co-worker relations
are associated with a lower wage. Borzaga and Depedri (2005) provide evidence for
this negative relation between co-worker satisfaction and wages in the Italian non-
prot sector. In line with this, Hamilton et al. (2003) show that some employees
in a Californian garment factory voluntarily agreed to join team production, even
though this resulted in an income loss, suggesting that these workers received some
non-monetary rewards from teamwork.
This thesis studies the interaction between co-worker relations and the nancial
incentives that are o¤ered. Besides a direct investment in the social interaction
between co-worker relations, rms may have some inuence over co-worker relations
with the nancial incentives they o¤er their employees. Employees may treat their
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colleagues di¤erently depending on how their colleaguese¤ort a¤ects wages. The
existing body of literature identies a rich number of channels through which a
workers compensation can shape his actions towards colleagues: Team incentives
may stimulate helping behavior (Fitzroy and Kraft 1986 and Itoh 1991a), or lead
to increased peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear 1992 and Barron and Gjerde 1997).
Promotion tournaments may induce colleagues to sabotage each other (Lazear 1989).
This thesis contributes to the literature that studies how incentives inuence the
interaction between colleagues, with both a theoretical model in Chapter 2 and a
eld experiment in Chapter 4.
Notwithstanding the positive aspects of social interaction between co-workers
mentioned above, facilitating interaction is not without risk. Managers perceive
o¢ ce gossip, distraction from work, and disturbance of merit-based decision making,
as threats that come with workplace friendships (Berman et al. 2002). Chapter 3 of
this thesis studies the latter concern that interpersonal relations between colleagues
may inuence the e¤ectiveness of the nancial incentives that are being o¤ered.
Social relations in the workplace inuence how employees react to the incentives
in place, and thereby shape the opportunities to introduce e¤ective nancial incen-
tives. For example, employees with good co-worker relations may take the e¤ect
of their e¤ort on colleagues more into account (Rotemberg 1994). Bandiera et al.
(2005) found that productivity went up when a rm moved from relative perfor-
mance incentives to individual piece rates, especially for those workers who worked
alongside their friends. In line with this, in a one-time employment setting, Cohn
(2010) found that a negative externality in wages led to a signicant drop in pro-
ductivity when employees were given the opportunity to interact with co-workers.
In this study, social interaction did not increase productivity under team incentives.
Further, in a laboratory experiment, Towry (2003) shows that a team incentive
was strengthened with team identity, whereas productivity was undermined when
compensation depended on the report of a colleague.
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1.2 Field Experiments
According to empiricists, knowledge arises from experience and observation. This
notion is central to the practice of science, where theories have to withstand empirical
scrutiny. However, simple observation is often not su¢ cient to falsify a hypothesis,
as one needs the counterfactual of an observation to nd conclusive evidence. For
example, to conclude that a policy had a positive impact on worker productivity,
it is not enough to observe an increase in productivity. There may have been fac-
tors unrelated to this policy that have led to the increase. Ideally, one would like
to observe the same workers in the scenario where they were not exposed to the
policy, i.e., the counterfactual. It is the empirical economists task to create such
counterfactuals. Experiments create counterfactuals by random assignment to a
policy; workers that are assigned to the control group serve as the counterfactual to
those that are assigned to the policy. With naturally occurring data, the empirical
economist has to use some identication method to create the counterfactual, e.g.,
with instrumental variables, or matching. Field experiments are the latest addition
to the empirical economists toolbox. In this section, I discuss some vices and virtues
of eld experiments: It is not meant to be exhaustive, for a more detailed overview
of eld experiments in labour economics see List and Rasul (2010).
According to John List, an advocate of eld experiments in economics, eld ex-
periments build a bridge between laboratory experiments and naturally occurring
data (List 2006). The credibility of the results in studies using naturally occurring
data, i.e., the internal validity, depends on the quality of the identication method
that has been used. Laboratory experiments directly allow for causal inference,
as randomization of the treatment gives the counterfactuals in the control group.
However, laboratory experiments may lack realism in the stakes involved, the repre-
sentativeness of the participants, or the presence of an experimenter, among other
dimensions (Harrison and List 2004, Levitt and List 2007). Therefore, its external
validity is often questioned. A natural eld experiment, dened as an experiment
Other goals of empirical research can be to make inference about a larger population from
observations in a smaller sample (empirical exploration), or to estimate or forecast variables of
interest.
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where participants act in their natural environment without being aware of the ex-
periment (Reiley and List 2008), combines the virtues of randomization and realism.
Obviously eld experiments are no magic potion. When moving to the eld,
experimenters often have to give up some control in exchange for a more realistic
setting. There also remain concerns with the external validity, as results from eld
experiments may be specic to the local conditions (examples abound in Rodrik
2009). Even if the results from small-scale eld experiments would not be specic to
local conditions, the results do not automatically generalize to a larger population
due to possible general equilibrium e¤ects. For example, suppose a eld experiment
has shown that more productive workers sort into a rm that pays for performance,
such sorting is unlikely to occur when all rms start paying for performance. Most
discussions of the merits and limitations of eld experiments conclude that they
complement the existing empirical methods.
Finally, there are some concerns that researchers should keep in mind irrespective
of the empirical method that is being applied. A rst concern is the sample selection
bias, meaning that the studied sample di¤ers from the population at large in ways
that may bias the results. The results in Chapter 4 and 5 may also su¤er from
this bias. Namely, the eld experiment took place in only one of the 15 companies
that we approached. Therefore, it is possible that this company had some distinct
features, like a management that was willing to experiment. This may have had
an inuence on the results. However, the sample selection bias is not specic to
the experimental method alone; naturally occurring data may also su¤er from this
bias. Banerjee and Duo (2009) provide the following example: Large programs are
politically more sensitive to evaluate than pilot programs, since they are usually well
publicized, and so countries may be strategic with respect to the choice of programs
to evaluate.(p. 19).
A second concern is the publication bias, which arises when the likelihood of
research ndings being published depends on having results that are signicantly
di¤erent from zero.y The non-reporting of zero results is also referred to as the le
yThere may be good reasons for journals to favor studies with signicant results, as their
research method or data may have been of superior quality. For example, Chapter 4 will probably
have di¢ culties ending up in a journal, as there are multiple viable explanations for the zero
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drawer problem, where studies without signicant results proverbially disappear
into the le drawer (Rosenthal 1979). Rosenthal argues that this problem can be
overcome by replication, as a large number of studies showing signicant results
would require an inconceivable large le drawer with zero results to counteract the
existing results. However, the combination of theoretical presumptions among re-
searchers and the discretion they have over the control variables they include, can
still lead to a harmful publication bias. Card and Krueger (1995) argue that the
literature on the e¤ect of minimum wages on employment may su¤er from such bias.
In a meta-analysis they show that the estimated e¤ect typically is twice the standard
error, irrespective of the size of the e¤ect, and that the t-values do not increase with
the number of observations. Finally, the publication bias may not be limited to the
favoring of signicant results. Replications of earlier studies have di¢ culties making
their way into leading journals even when their ndings are signicant. This problem
is arguably most severe for experiments. As Rodrik (2009) puts it: Perhaps ironi-
cally, other types of studies that have weaker internal validity generate much greater
incentive for replication. Here the name of the game is improved identication, ...
(p. 23).
1.3 Overview
The following two chapters provide a theoretical investigation of the interaction
between a workers nancial incentives and the interpersonal relations between co-
workers. Chapter 2 explores the possibility to stimulate co-worker relations by ne-
tuning a workers nancial incentives. In the principal-multi-agent setting under
study, agents not only choose productive e¤ort, but also engage in social interaction
with their colleagues. Social interaction is modeled as an exchange of attention,
where giving attention is costly. The receipt of attention gives a consumption benet
and a¤ects a workers social preferences: That is, agents are conditionally altruistic,
i.e., altruism towards a colleague increases in the receipt of his attention. The pri-
vate costs and external benets of attention provision give rise to an internalization
result. However, the publication bias implicitly refers to favoring studies with signicant results
over studies with zero results of comparable research quality.
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problem, resulting in suboptimal attention provision.
We show that the principal can stimulate social interaction between colleagues
by o¤ering agents either team incentives or relative performance incentives. This
externality in a workers compensation gives agents the desire to inuence the e¤ort
choice of their colleagues. The strategic motivation to provide additional attention
to a colleague is the following: As the co-workers altruism towards the giving agent
is increasing in the receipt of attention, attention provision will trigger a reciprocal
reaction. That is, the altruistic colleague partly internalizes the e¤ect of his e¤ort on
the giving agent, adjusting his e¤ort in the desired direction in response to the receipt
of attention. Thereby, the principal intentionally introduces an externality of e¤ort
to mitigate the externality problem of attention provision. The principal restores
incentives for e¤ort either by muting individual incentives for e¤ort in combination
with team incentive, or amplifying individual incentives when combined with relative
performance incentives, such that the rst-best is obtained.
Chapter 3, instead, studies how existing co-worker relations inuence the optimal
use of incentives. I look into a setting where co-workers have better information
about each others behavior than their manager. In the model this boils down to
colleagues receiving signals about each others e¤ort choice, while the principal only
observes the team output. The principal attempts to improve upon o¤ering a team
bonus by asking agents to send evaluation reports about their colleague. I start
from ideal circumstances for these peer evaluations by assuming that agents have
costs of lying about the signals they receive. Truthful peer evaluation gives an
agent incentives to exert e¤ort, because he desires to increase the likelihood that his
colleague receives a positive signal and evaluates performance accordingly. In this
case, a bonus for the receipt of a positive peer evaluation performs just as well as
individual incentives for e¤ort.
Next, I allow for co-worker relations, either good or bad, which may bias the
evaluation decisions. Agents trade-o¤ the cost of lying and the internalized utility
of a bonus given to a (dis)liked colleague. Small costs of lying, strong social pref-
erences, or a large reward for a positive evaluation can lead friends to give each
other positive evaluations irrespective of the received signal, as well as cause foes
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always to begrudge each other the peer evaluation bonus. The principal can ensure
that peer evaluation remains truthful by adjusting the peer evaluation bonus down-
ward. Nevertheless, the optimal contract always includes a peer evaluation bonus,
which is complemented with a team bonus in case peer evaluation becomes severely
restricted.
Chapter 4 and 5 describe the results of two eld experiments. Both experiments
took place in a Dutch retail chain of 128 stores. The stores operate under a single
brand, and sell clothing and shoes. The management wanted to introduce incentives
for store employees, who, unlike store managers, only receive a xed wage. In both
experiments we introduced a temporary team incentive for all employees within
a store. Neither store managers nor store employees were aware that they took
part in an experiment, which classies the experiments as natural eld experiments
(Harrison and List 2004).
Chapter 4 studies the determinants and the e¤ects of anti-shirking behavior; i.e.,
actions that employees undertake when they observe a colleague not working as hard
as he or she should. During the experiment all employees in treated stores could earn
a team reward by raising the number of items sold per purchase above a given target.
We hypothesized that anti-shirking behavior may inuence the e¤ectiveness of a
team incentive and may be a¤ected by the presence of a team incentive. Therefore,
we held a questionnaire to gauge a stores anti-shirking culture both prior to and
after the experiment.
The team incentive did not lead to additional sales during the experiment.
The short-run team incentive did cause a reduction in the willingness to under-
take anti-shirking behavior. We provide suggestive evidence for the claim that this
decrease is the result of dissatisfaction with increased peer pressure during the ex-
periment. Namely, respondents in treated stores stated signicantly more often
that anti-shirking behavior led to resentment by the colleague at which the actions
were aimed, and signicantly less often that it led to an improvement of the col-
leagues behavior. Besides the unsatisfactory experiences with anti-shirking behav-
ior, di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations also show that co-worker relations su¤ered
in treated stores. An alternative explanation, that employees might have showed a
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general dissatisfaction in treated stores, is ruled out by showing that job satisfaction
and employee-management relations are una¤ected by the treatment.
The eld experiment described in Chapter 5 introduced sales contests, i.e., tour-
naments, between stores. In one treatment the winning store and the runner-up
could earn a nancial reward, while in a second treatment there was only the honor
of winning (i.e., no nancial reward). Both types of tournaments led to signicantly
higher sales growth compared to the control group, and we nd no di¤erence be-
tween the treatments. This result is in line with recent literature that shows positive
e¤ects of relative performance feedback (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol 2009 and Azmat
and Iriberri 2010) and non-monetary rewards of winning a contest (Kosfeld and
Neckermann 2011).
In addition, Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on gender di¤erences in com-
petition, by exploring whether the treatment e¤ects are heterogeneous in gender.
Unlike recent ndings (Gneezy et al. 2003, more references can be found in Chapter
5), we did not nd that the response towards competition di¤ered by gender, neither
at the store manager level nor at the employee level. Interestingly, the interaction
between the store manager and the gender composition of a team mattered for the
e¤ect of these competitions. Namely, the competition only had an e¤ect in stores
where the manager and a large fraction of the employees were of the same gen-
der. Our ndings are important for two reasons: First, we show that competition
can be equally stimulating to women, which possibly depends on the way that the
tournament is communicated. Second, the interaction is interesting for the compe-
tition over executive-level positions. In order to reach top positions, one should win
several promotion tournaments, where performance depends not only on ones own
performance, but also on the performance of the team one leads.
Finally, I conclude with Chapter 6, which provides a discussion of the results,
some managerial implications, and suggestions for further research.
Chapter 2
Social Interaction, Co-Worker
Altruism, and Incentives
Joint with Robert Dur
2.1 Introduction
Social interaction with colleagues is a highly valued job aspect for many workers.
Research in psychology, sociology, and management shows that receiving a¤ective
support from colleagues and having good interpersonal relationships at work are
positively associated with job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational com-
mitment, and negatively with employee stress and absenteeism (see among others
Price and Mueller, 1981; Riordan and Gri¤eth, 1995; Hodson, 1997; Ducharme
and Martin, 2000; Nielsen et al. 2000; Morrison 2004; Wagner and Harter, 2006).
Moreover, turnover intentions and actual turnover tend to be lower when workers
experience social support from co-workers (Price and Mueller, 1981; Riordan and
Gri¤eth, 1995; Nielsen et al., 2000; Morrison 2004; Mossholder et al., 2005). Social
interaction with colleagues is also one of the most missed job aspects under retired
workers in Australia (Shacklock, 2005) and it is one of the main drivers of job
search among Dutch unemployed (Van Echtelt and Ho¤, 2008). Lastly, using time-
A slightly adapted version of this chapter appeared in Games and Economic Behavior (2010)
Vol. 69: 293 - 301.
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use data for France and the US, Krueger and Schkade (2009) show that workers who
are in jobs that entail more frequent interactions with co-workers are more satised
with their jobs and in a better mood during work time.
These ndings have a clear managerial implication: In their struggle to attract
and retain workers, managers should strive to create and maintain high-quality co-
worker relationships. This view is conrmed by managers. Berman et al. (2002)
report the results of a survey among managers in the US and show that more than
85% of managers approve or strongly approve of workplace friendships. A similar
percentage reports that their organization actively encourages workplace friendship.
An obvious and widely used means of doing so is to facilitate social interaction
among co-workers through e.g. creating co¤ee corners or a nice canteen, having
Friday-afternoon drinks, or organizing after-work social events (Cohen and Prusak,
2001). However, as we shall see, when a companys workplace policies are limited
to facilitating social interaction, typically too little social interaction takes place,
implying lower than rst-best prots.
This chapter studies an alternative, complementary way to promote co-worker
relationships: ne-tuning workersnancial incentives. We develop a principal-multi-
agent model in which workers do not only engage in productive activities, but also
in social interaction with their colleagues. Workersproductive activities are, for
convenience, assumed to be fully contractible. Social interaction, however, is not
contractible at all. We model social interaction as an exchange of attentionbe-
tween workers. Attention may include showing interest in a colleagues personal life,
o¤ering a drink after working hours, or any other kind gestures. While receipt of
attention is always valued positively by workers, giving attention is assumed to be
costly, at least above a certain level of attention. The reason is clear: Although giv-
ing some attention can evidently be pleasurable, it is also time-consuming, expensive,
or perhaps even boresome at some point. In addition to these direct benets and
costs, we assume that social interaction creates altruistic feelings among colleagues.
More specically, we assume that receipt of attention leads to stronger feelings of
altruism towards the giving agent. As we shall see, in equilibrium this gives rise
to reciprocal behavior: When a worker has been treated kindly by a colleague, the
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worker cares more about his colleagues well-being, and adapts his future actions
accordingly.
We obtain two main results. First, when the rm provides only individual per-
formance incentives, too little social interaction takes place, implying lower than
rst-best prots for the rm.1 The reason is an externality problem. Each worker
internalizes the benets of giving attention to his co-workers in as far as he is al-
truistic towards his co-workers. Since people care more for themselves than they
do for their colleagues, there is too little social interaction in equilibrium. This is
costly to the rm: If the rm could induce workers to engage in more social in-
teraction, workersjob satisfaction would be higher, allowing the rm to pay lower
wages. Borzaga and Depedri (2005) have recently provided some evidence for such
compensating wage di¤erentials. They nd that, in Italian non-prot organizations,
satisfaction with colleagues is negatively associated with wages. Consistent with
this, the eld study by Hamilton et al. (2003) shows that quite a few workers of a
Californian garment factory were willing to give up a substantial part of their salary
so as to join team production, suggesting high non-pecuniary benets from working
in a team.
Second, the rm can promote social interaction among workers by including team
incentives or relative incentives in the workerscontract. Consequently, the rm can
achieve rst-best prots by choosing the right mix of individual incentives and team
or relative incentives. The intuition behind these results is as follows. Provision
of team or relative incentives creates externalities among workers. Team incentives
create positive e¤ort externalities, implying underprovision of e¤ort (free-riding);
relative incentives create negative e¤ort externalities, resulting in overprovision of
e¤ort from the perspective of the workers. These externality problems are less severe
when workers are more altruistic towards each other. Hence, contracts with team or
relative incentives strengthen workersincentives to invest in co-worker altruism. A
natural way to do so is to engage in social interaction with colleagues. In other words,
1A similar result can be found in Itohs (1991b) study of social relations and incentive contracts,
of which we became aware only after completing a rst draft of this paper. In contrast to our model,
workers in his model are not altruistic. Consequently, our results on optimal incentive contracts
starkly di¤er from his.
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by deliberately creating an additional externality problem among workers through
provision of either team or relative incentives, rms induce workers to resolve the
initial externality problem of too little attention provision. Incentives for productive
activities are restored through ne-tuning the level of individual incentives. Optimal
contracts thus induce workers to exert rst-best e¤ort and to give rst-best attention.
Consequently, the rm achieves rst-best prots.
Our models predictions concerning the e¤ect of team and relative incentives on
the quality of co-worker relationships and workers e¤ort are supported by exist-
ing empirical ndings. Firstly, there is evidence based on survey data. Burks et
al. (2009) study social preferences of bicycle messengers in Switzerland and San
Francisco and nd that, compared to couriers in rms that pay for individual per-
formance, couriers under team-based or hourly pay act more cooperatively in a
prisoners dilemma game and expect their co-workers to be more cooperative as
well.2 Moreover, the paper provides some evidence that these di¤erences in social
preferences are endogenous to the employers choice of compensation scheme. Like-
wise, Carpenter and Seki (2011) nd among Japanese shermen that those who pool
their catch at the end of day are signicantly more altruistic towards each other than
those who organized themselves into groups that do not pool. Heywood et al. (2005)
analyze data from the German Socioeconomic Panel and nd evidence for the view
that promotions and prot-sharing are alternative means of generating cooperation
among workers. Their measure of cooperation is workersresponse to the question
"Do you get along with your colleagues?", which is close in spirit to the quality of
interpersonal relationships that we focus on. Heywood and Wei (2006) examine data
from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (US) and nd that co-worker sat-
isfaction is signicantly higher for workers who recently received a promotion. No
such relation is found between co-worker satisfaction and individual performance
pay, prot-sharing, or the wage level.
A potential problem with evidence based on survey data is reversed causality:
It may well be that high-quality co-worker relations are a determinant rather than
2Unfortunately (for our purpose), the study pools the data for couriers under team-based and
hourly pay. About 70% of the subjects in this pool receive team-based pay, the remaining 30% are
on hourly pay.
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the result of team or relative incentives. Field experiments circumvent this problem.
Rotemberg (1994) discusses the famous Hawthorne experiments (Roethlisberger and
Dickson, 1939) where both workersnancial incentives and their opportunities for
socializing were varied. The results suggest that team incentives encouraged friend-
ship among workers and that this friendship was instrumental in raising output.
More recently, the eld study by Bandiera et al. (2005) compares fruit pickerspro-
ductivity under individual incentives and relative incentives. Their results strongly
suggest that, when workers are paid on the basis of relative performance, they par-
tially internalize the negative externality their e¤ort imposes on others, especially
when working alongside their friends. They do not nd evidence for pure altruism,
however. One reason for this could be that workers in their sample are hired on
a daily basis, with no guarantee of further employment, giving little incentives to
build up relationships.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a brief overview of
related literature and discuss how our chapter contributes to it. Section 2.3 presents
the model. In Section 2.4 and 2.5 we examine the case of perfect contractibility and
the case of non-contractible attention, respectively. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
This chapter builds on Rotembergs (1994) seminal analysis of human relations in
the workplace. He argues that, when workersactions are strategic complements and
workers are paid as a function of joint output, they may rationally choose to become
altruistic towards each other. Altruism serves as a commitment device to exert more
e¤ort, which due to the strategic complementarity of workerse¤orts induces co-
workers also to exert more e¤ort. This is in the workers narrow self-interest because
of the free-rider problem inherent in team incentives.
We di¤er from his analysis in three important respects. First, while Rotemberg
studies the e¤ect of team incentives in isolation, we derive the properties of rst-best
contracts which are shown to consist of a mix of di¤erent types of incentives. Second,
in contrast to Rotemberg, strategic complementarity between workersproductive
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actions is not a necessary condition for co-worker altruism to arise in our model.
The reason is that we allow for a consumption benet from social interaction at
work, which is absent in Rotemberg. Last, and most important, we do not allow
people to directly choose their altruistic feelings towards others. Instead, we assume
that people may attempt to make others feel more altruistic towards them by being
kind, showing attention, paying respect, o¤ering favors, and so on. Thus, while as
in Rotemberg an individuals altruistic feelings are endogenous in our model, the
individual does not choose his feelings, but his feelings can be a¤ected by other
peoples actions.
The way we model social interaction between workers and how it a¤ects co-
workers altruism is close to the formalization of social ties in van Dijk and van
Winden (1997). In their model, as in ours, social ties are represented by inter-
dependent utility functions, where the weight assigned to the utility of the other
agent depends on the history of interaction.3 The positive relationship between so-
cial interaction and the formation of social ties is supported by a large number of
empirical studies in several branches of the social sciences. For example, Homans
(1950) concludes from observations of workers at the Western Electric Company
that "favourable sentiments increase as interaction increases" (p. 112). Additional
support for this hypothesis can be found in Baumeister and Leary (1995), van Dijk
et al. (2002), and Hays (1988). We di¤er from van Dijk and van Winden (1997) in
the application, as they analyze the inuence of social ties on the contribution to
a public good. Further, we do not make the assumption that individuals are my-
opic with respect to the feelings of a colleague; instead workers may invest in social
relationships for strategic reasons, e.g., to alleviate externality problems.
In another related approach, Cox et al. (2007) have developed a model where
the marginal rate of substitution between an agents own income and the income of
another is inuenced by actions of this other agent. In particular, an agent becomes
more willing to pay for the income of the other agent, i.e., becomes more altruis-
3In a related approach by Bolle and Kritikos (2006), the altruism parameter is not dened as
the weight assigned to the utility of the other agent, but as the marginal utility of a transfer to
another agent. However, like in van Dijk and van Winden (1997), this altruism parameter depends
on the past interaction with this agent.
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tic, if the other agent has been more generous to the former. Recently, Cox et al.
(2008) formulated a similar theory in a more general (nonparametric) framework of
preferences over ones own and other peoples payo¤s. Both papers discuss results of
existing laboratory experiments to validate the model. The results of these experi-
ments indicate that people do become more altruistic in response to kind behavior.
The results of our analysis are in stark contrast to those of Lazear (1989) on
sabotage in tournaments and of Kandel and Lazear (1992) on peer pressure in teams.
These papers predict worse rather than better co-worker relations under relative
or team incentives compared to individual incentives (see also Barron and Gjerde,
1997). While we obviously do not deny that sabotage and peer pressure are relevant
in many settings (see e.g., Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2005) on dirty playin
professional soccer), the empirical evidence discussed in the previous section strongly
suggests that opposite forces such as those studied in this chapter can sometimes
dominate.
The economics literature provides two alternative ways through which team-
based pay may improve upon the work climate: by increasing workerswillingness
to help each other and by reducing pay inequity at the workplace. Studies stressing
workershelping behavior include FitzRoy and Kraft (1986), Drago and Turnbull
(1988), Itoh (1991a), Rob and Zemsky (2002), and Corneo and Rob (2003). A crucial
di¤erence between these studies and ours is that helping or cooperating is assumed
productive in these studies, implying that there is a team-element in production,
which is not necessarily the case in our model. This chapter can thus explain the
prevalence of team-based pay and their positive e¤ects on the work climate, even
when there is little or no complementarity between workersproductive e¤orts. The
same holds for studies which consider inequity-averse workers (see Bartling, 2007;
Demougin and Fluet, 2006; Englmaier and Wambach, 2010; Goel and Thakor, 2006;
Grund and Sliwka, 2005; Itoh, 2004; Rey-Biel, 2007). When workers dislike pay
inequality, team incentives may outperform both individual and relative incentives,
because team incentives generate little inequality of pay among workers. We di¤er
from these studies in that workers are altruistic rather than inequity-averse, and
that workersaltruism is endogenously determined. One implication is that in line
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with the empirical evidence mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph the
introduction of team-based incentives on top of at wages increases the quality of
co-worker relations in our model, while it is neutral in models of inequity aversion.
Moreover, our results on the e¤ects of relative incentives are also clearly di¤erent
from those that arise when workers are inequity averse.
2.3 The model
We consider a prot-maximizing principal who employs two homogenous agents.4
Agents produce output by exerting e¤ort. E¤ort of agent i is denoted by ei  0.
Total prots of the principal are:
 = Q(ei; ej)  wi   wj;
where the production function Q satises the Inada conditions with respect to all
inputs, and wi denotes agent is wage.
Agents care about three things: their wage, their cost of e¤ort, and their net
benet from social interaction with colleagues. We model social interaction as an
exchange of attention between agents. We assume that receiving attention is plea-
surable, while giving attention is costly.5 The utility function of agent i is:
Ui = wi   C(ei; aij) +G(aji) + F (aji; Uj); (2.1)
where aij  0 denotes the attention given by agent i to agent j. The cost function
C is strictly convex and increasing in both arguments and satises the conditions
C(0; 0) = 0, Ce(0; aij) = 0, and Ca(ei; 0) = 0, where subscripts to functions denote
partial derivatives. For simplicity, we assume that Cea() = 0.6 Receiving attention
4Our results generalize to the case of an arbitrary number n > 2 of agents. Details can be
found in the appendix.
5These assumptions are stronger than we need: They only need to hold at the margin in the
optimum. For instance, allowing agents to enjoy giving attention up to some point would not
change our results qualitatively. Clearly, in practice, receipt of attention is sometimes costly; in
those cases, our results do not carry over.
6Clearly, giving and receiving attention takes time and, hence, may increase workers marginal
cost of e¤ort. On the other hand, as shown by some of the studies we discussed in the introduction,
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generates two types of benets to an agent, represented by the functions G and F .
First, we allow for a consumption benet from attention, captured by the strictly
concave and increasing function G, with Ga(0) = +1.7 Second, we assume that
receipt of attention leads to feelings of altruism for the giving agent, which increases
the utility of the receiving agent. This is captured by the function F (aji; Uj) =
ajiUj, where  > 0. The specic functional form keeps the analysis tractable.8 To
ensure an interior solution, we shall abstract from situations where Fu  1.9 That is,
agents always care more for themselves than for others. Last, note that the linearity
of utility in income implies that the agent is risk-neutral.
The principal o¤ers a contract to each agent that makes each agent at least as
well o¤ as his outside option U > 0. The principal can condition the agents wage
on the e¤ort of the agent himself and also on the e¤ort of his colleague (wi(ei; ej)).
We shall speak of individual incentives when wiei(ei; ej) > 0, of team incentives when
wiej(ei; ej) > 0, and of relative incentives when w
i
ej
(ei; ej) < 0.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the rst stage, the principal o¤ers con-
tracts to the agents, which they accept or reject. Next, agents decide simultaneously
and independently how much attention to give to their co-worker. In the last stage,
agents decide on the level of e¤ort they exert.10
social contact with colleagues can reduce stress and increase job involvement. In practice, both
of these arguments are likely to play a role, which may explain why the empirical evidence on
the relation between worker cohesiveness and productivity is rather mixed (see Rotemberg 2006
for an overview). Itoh (1991b) provides a thorough analysis of the consequences of these kind of
interdependencies between e¤ort and attention provision in a closely related principal-multi-agent
model.
7As will become clear, our results are qualitatively the same in the absence of a consumption
benet from receiving attention.
8Clearly, the specic functional form implies that receipt of attention increases the utility
of the receiving agent only when the giving agent has positive utility, which we assume. This
assumption is, however, inessential. The analysis would be unchanged if the function F depended
on the di¤erence between the utility that the giving agent obtains and the utility Us that he
would obtain if the receiving agent provided the selsh levels of e¤ort and attention (that is,
F (aji; Uj) = aji (Uj   Us)).
9Clearly, this is ensured when agents do not get a positive utility from a  1 . Note that
it is easy to extend the function to allow for unconditional altruism or spite, e.g. F (aji; Uj) =
(aji + )Uj , where  6= 0. This would not a¤ect our results qualitatively except for situations
where unconditional spite is very strong so that creation of co-worker altruism through social
interaction is ine¢ cient.
10Obviously, in the one-shot game that we study, the exact timing is important for the results.
In a repeated setting where agents alternately give attention and provide e¤ort, this would be
much less of a concern. In such a setting, it is important that the agents have a nite horizon
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2.4 Complete contract
We start by studying the benchmark case where both e¤ort and attention are con-
tractible. Full contractibility implies that there is no reason to condition the wage on
e¤ort, and so an agents compensation only consists of a base salary in this section.
The principals optimization problem is:
max
ei;ej ;aij ;aji;wi;wj
Q(ei; ej)  wi   wj
subject to the agentsparticipation constraints:
wi   C(ei; aij) +G(aji) + F (aji; Uj)  U; (2.2)
wj   C(ej; aji) +G(aij) + F (aij; Ui)  U: (2.3)
The rst-best levels of e¤ort and attention are described in Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 The complete contract has the following properties:
1. E¤ort of each agent is strictly positive and equates the marginal benets of
e¤ort to the principal with the marginal cost of e¤ort to the agent: Qe() =
Ce();
2. Attention by each agent is strictly positive and equates the receiving agents
marginal benets with the giving agents marginal cost of attention: Ga() +
Fa() = Ca().
3. The wage makes each agent indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the
contract, given the rst-best levels of e¤ort and attention: w = U + C()  
G()  F ().
The proof is given in the appendix. As usual, the rst-best contract induces
agents to exert the level of e¤ort that maximizes the joint surplus. The principal
optimally includes a positive level of attention in the contract. Even though attention
(e.g., retirement). In an innite horizon model, rst-best attention may arise as equilibrium play
without any contractual arrangements by the principal.
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entails a cost for the giving agent, it produces a pleasant working environment for
the receiving agent, which allows the principal to pay a lower wage.
2.5 Incomplete contracts
Next let us consider the more realistic case where workers attention is not con-
tractible; the principal cannot contract on workersactions like showing interest in
a colleagues personal life, treating colleagues with courtesy, or giving a¤ective sup-
port. We keep the assumption of contractible e¤ort.11 As we shall see, the principal
nds it optimal to condition each agents wage on the e¤ort of both agents, w(ei; ej).
For convenience, we assume that the wage contract is linear in both ei and ej. This
is innocuous: As will become clear, the principal can not do better by o¤ering non-
linear contracts. Let wiei denote agent is bonus per unit of e¤ort provided by agent
i (representing individual incentives) and let wiej denote agent is bonus per unit of
e¤ort provided by agent j (representing team or relative incentives). Further, let
si be agent is base salary. We solve the maximization problem of the principal by
backward induction, starting with the agents choice of e¤ort.
The rst-order condition for agent is optimal e¤ort is described by:
wiei() + wjei()Fuj()  Cei() = 0: (2.4)
E¤ort has three e¤ects on an agents utility. First, when the principal gives individual
incentives, the agents wage increases with his e¤ort. Second, when the principal has
installed team incentives or relative incentives, agent is e¤ort choice a¤ects agent js
income. Agent i cares about this e¤ect to the extent that he is altruistic towards his
colleague. Last, there is a cost of providing e¤ort. The optimal e¤ort level equates
these benets and costs at the margin.
The comparative static e¤ect of social interaction on the agents e¤ort is sum-
marized in the following Lemma.
11None of the results change when e¤ort is noncontractible as long as the principal can contract
on a (noisy) signal of each agents e¤ort (e.g. output). Extending the model to allow for risk
aversion of agents in the presence of noisy signals of e¤ort does not a¤ect our results qualitatively.
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Lemma 2.1 Social interaction a¤ects the agents choice of e¤ort as follows:
1. The e¤ect of received attention on e¤ort is described by:
dei
daji
=
Fujaji()wjei()
Ceiei()
; (2.5)
implying that an agents e¤ort increases with received attention when the con-
tract includes team incentives, while e¤ort decreases with received attention
when the contract includes relative incentives.
2. Attention given by agent i has no e¤ect on his e¤ort:
dei
daij
= 0:
The rst part of Lemma 2.1 echoes the results by Rotemberg (1994) and Bandiera
et al. (2005) on the relation between co-worker altruism and e¤ort. When workers
care for one another, they partly take into account the externalities they impose
on others. Compared to egoistic agents, this implies higher e¤ort under team in-
centives and lower e¤ort under relative incentives. As co-worker altruism increases
with received attention, e¤ort increases with attention under team incentives and it
decreases with attention under relative incentives. The second part of Lemma 2.1
directly follows from the separability of e¤ort cost and attention cost in the workers
utility function. Clearly, when e¤ort and attention would be substitutes, agents
e¤ort would decrease with attention given by the agent.
In the previous stage of the game, the agents decide independently on how much
attention to give to their co-worker, taking into account the e¤ect of their attention
on e¤ort in the next stage of the game. The rst-order condition for agents optimal
attention is:
dUi
daij
=  Caij() +
dUj
daij
Fuj() +
dei
daij
dUi
dei
+
dej
daij
dUi
dej
= 0: (2.6)
Using the agentsrst-order conditions for optimal e¤ort (2.4), this can be simplied
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to:
 Caij() +
dUj
daij
Fuj() +
dej
daij
dUi
dej
= 0: (2.7)
Besides the direct cost of attention provision, giving attention has two e¤ects on the
agents utility. First, when the agent has altruistic feelings towards his co-worker, he
enjoys the increase in his co-workers utility resulting from the receipt of attention.
Di¤erentiating (2.1), it follows that the increase in the co-workers utility is:
dUj
daij
= Gaij() + Faij() + Fui()
dUi
daij
; (2.8)
where the last term drops by the envelope theorem, using (2.6). Second, there is an
indirect e¤ect of attention provision through the co-workers e¤ort choice: By giving
more attention, the agent induces the co-worker to change his level of e¤ort in the
next stage, which in turn a¤ects the agents utility. Di¤erentiating (2.1) it follows
that:
dUi
dej
= wiej() + Fuj()
dUj
dej
= wiej(); (2.9)
where the last equality follows from applying the envelope theorem, using the rst-
order condition for optimal e¤ort (2.4). Clearly, an agents utility is only a¤ected
by his co-workers e¤ort when the contract includes team incentives or relative per-
formance incentives. Similarly, we learned from Lemma 2.1 that a workers e¤ort is
only a¤ected by received attention when the contract has team or relative incentives.
Taking these two results together, it follows that the last term of the rst-order con-
dition (2.7) is strictly positive when either team incentives or relative incentives are
part of the agents contract. That is, both team incentives and relative incentives
create an additional marginal benet from attention provision for each agent. This
benet stems from the e¤ect of attention-giving on co-worker altruism and, hence,
on e¤ort. When the contract has team incentives, an agents provision of attention
induces the other agent to exert more e¤ort in the next stage, which benets the
agent. Likewise, when the contract has relative incentives, the agents provision of
attention induces the other agent to exert less e¤ort in the next stage, which again
benets the agent. Lemma 2.2 follows.
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Lemma 2.2 Both team incentives and relative incentives promote social interaction
among workers.
Intuitively, when team incentives are provided, agents invest in altruism so as to
foster cooperation. When relative incentives are provided, agents invest in altruism
so as to tame their colleagues eagerness to outperform.
Substituting (2.5), (2.8) and (2.9) into (2.7) gives agent is rst-order condition
for optimal attention in a rewritten form:
 Caij() + Fuj()

Gaij() + Faij()

+
Fuiaij()wiej()
Cejej()
wiej() = 0: (2.10)
Our next result follows immediately and is described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.2 When the principal does not provide team incentives or relative
incentives (wiej = 0 for all i 6= j), there is too little social interaction in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 follows from a comparison of the rst-order condition for atten-
tion (2.10) with rst-best attention as described by Proposition 2.1. In the absence
of team or relative incentives, the last term of rst-order condition (2.10) drops.
Comparing with the rst-best as described by Proposition 2.1, it follows that there
is too little social interaction in any equilibrium where Fu < 1, as we have imposed.
That is: As agents care less about their co-worker than about themselves, the bene-
ts from attention provision are not fully internalized. Underprovision of attention
results. Note that there exist multiple equilibria. First, an equilibrium exists where
neither of the agents give attention. When an agent believes that the other agent
will not give any attention, the second term of (2.10) is zero, implying that the agent
only faces costs from attention provision (as reected by the rst term of (2.10)).
Hence, given that an agent expects to receive no attention, it is optimal for him
to give no attention as well. Second, depending on the exact shape of the func-
tions, one or more equilibria with positive attention exist. When the function G(),
representing the consumption benets from attention, is su¢ ciently concave, or the
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cost function C() is su¢ ciently convex in attention, there is a unique equilibrium
with strictly positive attention.12 Anyway, since in all possible equilibria attention
is described by (2.10), attention is always at a suboptimal level. As a result, the
principals prots are lower than rst-best.13
Last, consider the principals contract design problem, which is given by:
max
wiei ;w
i
ej
;wjej ;w
j
ei
;si;sj
Q(ei; ej)  (wiei + wjei)ei   (wiej + wjej)ej   si   sj;
subject to the agentsparticipation constraints (2.2) and (2.3). First-best e¤ort,
attention, and prots are achieved by the incentive contract described in Proposition
2.3.
Proposition 2.3 When attention cannot be contracted, but e¤ort can, the principal
achieves rst-best prots by o¤ering an incentive contract consisting of a base salary,
individual incentives, and team or relative incentives. Optimal individual incentives
are described by:
wiei = Qei()  Fuj()wjei for i 6= j;
and optimal team or relative incentives are described by:
wiej = 
s
(1  Fuj()) [Gai() + Fai()]Cee()
Fuiaij()
for i 6= j;
where all functions are evaluated at the rst-best levels of e¤ort and attention, as
described by Proposition 2.1. The level of the base salary follows from the agents
participation constraints.
The proof is in the appendix. The principal can obtain maximum prots by
including a mix of individual incentive pay and team or relative incentive pay in the
12The appendix describes the precise condition; it rules out that agents responsiveness to re-
ceived attention increases with received attention. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall assume
that this condition holds.
13Note that, since this result holds for any level of the cost of attention, companies that restrict
their workplace policies to facilitating social interaction (that is, reducing agents marginal cost of
attention) will achieve lower than rst-best prots.
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contract. As we have seen in Lemma 2.2, team or relative incentives can be used to
promote social interaction. In the optimum, the team incentives or relative incentives
are chosen such that, given rst-best e¤ort, the agents provide rst-best attention
as described in Proposition 2.1. Next, the principal can ensure that agents exert
rst-best e¤ort by adjusting the individual incentives. When attention provision
is stimulated through team incentives, individual incentives are muted, since an
agent enjoys the positive e¤ect his e¤ort has on his colleagues wage. With relative
incentives, the e¤ort of an agent negatively inuences the utility of his co-worker,
which in equilibrium is an additional cost of e¤ort. Individual incentives therefore
need to be adjusted upwards to restore e¢ cient e¤ort provision.
2.6 Concluding remarks
For many employees, social interaction with colleagues is one of the key determinants
of job satisfaction. We have studied the inuence of nancial incentives for produc-
tive activities on the quality of co-worker relationships in a model where agents have
endogenous other-regarding preferences. Following earlier work on the formation of
social ties, we have assumed that the strength of a workers altruistic feelings towards
a colleague is increasing with the colleagues kindness towards the worker. We have
seen that, absent team or relative incentives, workers do not invest enough in their
relationships with their co-workers, as the benets from relationship-building to the
colleague are not fully internalized. This externality problem comes at a cost to
the employer, as good co-worker relationships allow employers to attract and retain
workers without paying high wages. We have shown that employers can stimulate
social interaction among colleagues by providing either team incentives or relative
incentives.
We have deliberately kept the analysis as simple as possible. An interesting next
step would be to study situations where the employer can only contract on team
output, so that team incentives serve a dual role: promoting productive e¤ort and
stimulating social interaction. In such situations, too much social interaction may
arise (as strong team incentives may be optimal to boost production, but as a side-
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e¤ect create too much concern among workers to please each other). In response to
this, employers may take actions so as to increase workerscost of giving attention.
Likewise, employers may not be so keen on encouraging social interaction when
relative performance incentives are the sole instrument to promote e¤ort. Other
interesting extensions include heterogeneity in workerssocial preferences and the
sorting of di¤erent types of workers to rms o¤ering di¤erent incentive schemes.
Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009, 2011) make interesting steps in that direction.
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2.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let i denote the Lagrange-multiplier for the participation constraint of agent i.
The rst-order conditions are:
Qei() + i
dUi
dei
+ j
dUj
dei
= 0; Qej() + i
dUi
dej
+ j
dUj
dej
= 0; (2.A1)
i
dUi
daij
+ j
dUj
daij
= 0; i
dUi
daji
+ j
dUj
daji
= 0; (2.A2)
 1 + i dUi
dwi
+ j
dUj
dwi
= 0;  1 + i dUi
dwj
+ j
dUj
dwj
= 0; (2.A3)
and the two participation constraints. Using (2.A1) and (2.A3) and noting that
dUj
dei
= Fu()dUi
dei
;
dUj
dwi
= Fu()dUi
dwi
;
dUi
dei

dUi
dwi
 1
=  Ce();
the rst part of Proposition 2.1 follows. Substituting
dUi
daij
=  Ca() + Fu()dUj
daij
dUj
daij
= Ga() + Fa() + Fu() dUi
daij
into (2.A2) yields after successive substitution:
[ Ca() +Ga() + Fa()]

1 + Fu() + F 2u () + :::+ F1u ()

= 0;
from which the second part of Proposition 2.1 follows. The third part follows from
(2.A1) and (2.A3) which imply that i = j > 0, and hence the participation
constraints bind.
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Condition for unique equilibrium with strictly positive attention
Agent is best-response curve has the following slope:
daij
daji
=  d
2Ui=daijdaji
d2Ui=da2ij
=  
Fujaji()

Gaij() + Faij()

+ Fuj()Faijui() dUidaji
 Caijaij() + Fuj()Gaijaij()
; (2.A4)
where
dUi
daji
= Gaji() + Faji() + Fuj
dUj
daji
: (2.A5)
Note that at the origin the slope of the best-response curve is innitely large, as
Gaij(0) ! +1. Hence, to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium with strictly
positive attention, it is su¢ cient that the best-response curve is strictly concave
when daij=daji > 0. The second derivative of the best-response curve is given by
the following expression:
d2aij
(daji)2
=  (d
3Ui=daijda
2
ji)(d
2Ui=da
2
ij)  (d3Ui=da2ijdaji)(d2Ui=daijdaji) 
d2Ui=da2ij
2 ;
where d2Ui=da2ij and d
3Ui=da
2
ijdaji are always negative by the second-order condition
and by the concavity of the G() function, respectively, and d2Ui=daijdaji is always
positive in the relevant area where daij=daji > 0 (see (2.A4)). Hence, a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition for the best-response function to be strictly concave
when daij=daji > 0 is:
d3Ui=daijda
2
ji = 2
2
 Caji() + aij  Gaji() + Ui+
2aji
 Cajiaji() + aij Gajiaji() +  (dUi=daji)	 < 0 (2.A6)
which is satised when the G() function is su¢ ciently concave or the C() function
is su¢ ciently convex in attention.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3
The agents choice of attention is described by rst-order condition (2.10). Com-
paring with Proposition 2.1, to achieve rst-best attention, the principal should set
incentives such that the last two terms of (2.10) equal Ga() + Fa(), or:
Fuj()

Gaij() + Faij()

+
Fuiaij()wiej
Cejej()
wiej = Ga() + Fa():
Solving for wiej gives the expression for relative or team incentives in Proposition
2.3. The optimal level of individual incentives follows along similar lines, using
rst-order condition (2.4) and the expression for rst-best e¤ort in Proposition 2.1.
Lastly, note that we do not need to be concerned about multiplicity of equilibria
since, rst, the equilibrium where both workers abstain from giving attention is no
longer an equilibrium when wiej 6= 0, and, second, there exists only one equilibrium
with strictly positive attention when condition (2.A6) holds, which is assumed.
Generalization to n-agents
The analysis in the main text can be generalized to an arbitrary number of identical
agents, where the proof follows the same lines as the proofs for 2 agents. The prots
of the principal are:
 = Q(e1; :::; en) 
X
i
wi;
and agent is utility function is:
Ui = wi   C(ei;
X
j 6=i
aij) +
X
j 6=i
G(aji) +
X
j 6=i
F (aji; Uj):
In this generalization of the results we proceed as follows, rst, we have to set a
boundary on the level of altruism. Second, we derive the rst-best e¤ort, attention,
and wage levels similar to Proposition 2.1. Finally, we demonstrate that with unob-
servable attention individual incentives alone do not lead to the rst-best, while it
can be obtained using team incentives and relative performance incentives, parallel
to Propositions 2.2 and 2.3.
For the analysis with n-agents we need to impose a stricter condition on the level
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of altruism. Our analysis with two agents illustrated a sort of social multiplier, as
agent i not only cared for agent js well-being, but also that agent j cares for i, and
that agent j cared that i cares about his well-being, etcetera , which converges only
if Fu < 1. With a larger number of agents convergence is more di¢ cult, because a
third or fourth agent benets from the good relationships between his colleagues.
That is, agent k is not only altruistic towards agent i and agent j, but he also enjoys
that agent i and agent j are altruistic towards him and each other. To ensure an
interior solution the level of altruism needs to satisfy Fu < 1n 1 , which we derive
next.14
After successive substitution the utility function becomes:
Ui = wi   C() +
X
j 6=i
G() +
nX
m=2

(m  1) n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

Ui: (2.A7)
From (2.A7) we can see the need for the assumption:
nX
m=2

(m  1) n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

< 1: (2.A8)
14Like in the main text, we actually need to assume that agents do not choose attention levels
where Fu  1n 1 , which is ensured if a  1(n 1) leads to a negative utility.
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We can rewrite the expression from (2.A8):
nX
m=2

(m  1) n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

= F 2u
nX
m=2

(m  1) n!
m!(n m)!F
m 2
u

= F 2u
nX
m=2

n!
m!(n m)!
d
dFu
Fm 1u

= F 2u
d
dFu
F 1u
nX
m=2

n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

= F 2u
d
dFu
F 1u
nX
m=0

n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

  n!
0!(n  0)!F
0
u  
n!
1!(n  1)!F
1
u

= F 2u
d
dFu
F 1u [(1 + Fu)
n   1  nFu] = F 2u

n(1 + Fu)
n 1Fu   [(1 + Fu)n   1]
F 2u

= 1 + n(1 + Fu)
n 1Fu   (1 + Fu)n = 1  (1 + Fu)n 1 [1  (n  1)Fu] ;
which allows us to simplify (2.A8):
nX
m=2

(m  1) n!
m!(n m)!F
m
u

< 1, 1  (1 + Fu)n 1 [1  (n  1)Fu] < 1,
, (1 + Fu)n 1 [1  (n  1)Fu] > 0,
, 1  (n  1)Fu > 0, Fu < 1
(n  1) ;
where the last line follows as Fu >  1, which was already satised the assumptions
y > 0 and a  0:
To derive the rst-best levels of e¤ort and attention we look at the principal who
maximizes prots subject to the n participation constraints (Ui = wi   C(ei; ai) +P
j 6=iG(aji) +
P
j 6=i F (aji; Uj)  U0). This constrained optimization problem has
the following rst-order conditions:
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Qei() + idUi
dei
+
X
j 6=i
j
dUj
dei
= 0; for 8i; i 6= j (2.A9)
 1 + i dUi
dwi
+
X
j 6=i
j
dUj
dwi
= 0; for 8i; i 6= j (2.A10)
i
dUi
daij
+ j
dUj
daij
+
X
k 6=i;j
k
dUk
daij
= 0; for 8i and 8j; i 6= j 6= k (2.A11)
and the participation constraints. As
dUj
dei
= F jui()
dUi
dei
+
X
k 6=i;j
F juk()
dUk
dei
;
and dUj
dei
= dUk
dei
, since the colleagues are a¤ected similarly by agent is e¤ort, we can
rewrite (2.A9):
Qei +
dUi
dei
"
i +
X
j 6=i
j
"
F jui()
1 Pk 6=i;j F juk()
##
= 0:
Similar, (2.A10) can be written as:
 1 + dUi
dwi
"
i +
X
j 6=i
j
"
F jui()
1 Pk 6=i;j F juk()
##
= 0:
Using
dUi
dei

dUi
dwi
 1
=  Cei();
from which the rst part of Proposition 2.1 follows. Likewise, noting that
dUk
daij
= F kui()
dUi
daij
+ F kuj()
dUj
daij
+
X
l 6=i;j;k
F kul()
dUl
daij
; (2.A12)
and dUk
daij
= dUl
daij
, as the attention from agent i to agent j a¤ects other (third party)
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colleagues the same, we can rewrite (2.A11):
dUi
daij
"
i +
nX
k 6=i;j
k
"
Fui()
1 Pl 6=i;j;k Ful()
##
+
dUj
daij
"
j +
X
k 6=i;j
k
"
Fuj()
1 Pl 6=i;j;k Ful()
##
= 0: (2.A13)
Given that agents are identical, we know that i = j, (2.A13) simplies to dUidaij +
dUj
daij
= 0. (2.A12) and dUk
daij
= dUl
daij
can be used to express dUi
daij
in dUj
daij
and vice versa,
which allows for a similar successive substitution argument as in the end of the proof
of Proposition 2.1. This gives the second part of Proposition 2.1 and completes the
generalization for the rst-best.
The generalization of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, where the agents attention choice
is unobservable follows the same steps as in the main text, solving the game back-
wards. In the derivation we assume that all individuals receive a similar linear
incentive scheme of the form: w = wieiei +
P
j 6=iw
i
ej
ej, however this innocuous as
it holds true for prot maximizing incentives. Further, as we will only look at a
symmetric equilibrium, all Fus may be set equal.
Agent is rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort is:
dUi
dei
= wiei()  Cei() +
X
j 6=i
F iuj()
wjei
1 Pk 6=j;i F juk = 0 (2.A14)
where there last term follows from:
dUj
dei
= wjei + F
j
ui
()dUi
dei
+
X
k 6=j;i
F juk()
dUk
dei
=
wjei
1 Pk 6=j;i F juk ; (2.A15)
combined with the envelope theorem. Note that, since agent is e¤ort level has
a similar inuence on the wage of each of his colleagues, we may put dUj
dei
= dUk
dei
.
From the agents rst-order condition (2.A14) we can derive comparative statics
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with respect to received and provided attention:
dei
daij
= 0; (2.A16)
dei
daji
=
Fujajiw
j
ei
Ceiei(1 
P
k 6=j;i F
j
uk)
(2.A17)
dei
dakj
=
FukakjFujw
j
ei
Ceiei(1 
P
k 6=j;i F
j
uk)
2
: (2.A18)
Agent is rst-order condition for giving attention to agent j is as follows:
dUi
daij
=  Caij()+F iuj()
dUj
daij
+
X
k 6=j;i
F iuk()
dUk
daij
+
dej
daij
dUi
dej
+
X
k 6=i;j
dek
daij
dUi
dek
= 0: (2.A19)
The attention from agent i to agent j a¤ects the other agents in the following way:
dUj
daij
= Gaij + Faij +
X
k 6=j;i
F juk()
dUk
daij
+
X
k 6=i;j
dek
daij
dUj
dek
(2.A20)
+ F jui()
dUi
daij
+
dei
daij
dUj
dei
;
dUk
daij
= F kuj()
dUj
daij
+
dej
daij
dUk
dej
+
X
l 6=k;j;i
F kul()
dUl
daij
+
X
l 6=k;j;i
del
daij
dUk
del
(2.A21)
+ F kui()
dUi
daij
+
dei
daij
dUk
dei
:
The expressions (2.A20) and (2.A21) need to be rewritten to substitute them into
(2.A19), because they contain each other. First, note that in both (2.A20) and
(2.A21) the last two terms drop, due to the envelope theorem and (2.A16). Further,
since we look at a symmetric equilibrium, we can save on notation by combining
(2.A17) and (2.A18), which gives dek
daij
= del
daij
= Fu
1 (n 2)Fu
dej
daij
and use dUi
dej
=
dUj
dei
for
8i, 8j, and i 6= j as well. In addition, we may replace the summations Pk 6=j;i andP
l 6=k;j;i with (n  2) and (n  3) respectively. Finally, noticing that dUkdaij =
dUl
daij
, one
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can substitute a slightly rewritten (2.A21) into (2.A20), which yields:
dUj
daij
= (Gaij + Faij)
1  (n  3)Fu
1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u
+ (2.A22)
dej
daij
dUi
dej
(n  2)Fu [2  (n  2)Fu]
[1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u ] [1  (n  2)Fu]
;
substituting (2.A22) back into (2.A21) gives:
dUk
daij
= (Gaij + Faij)
Fu
1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u
+ (2.A23)
dej
daij
dUi
dej
1  Fu + (n  2)F 2u
[1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u ] [1  (n  2)Fu]
:
The combination of (2.A19) with (2.A22) and (2.A23) presents:
dUi
daij
=  Caij() + (Gaij + Faij)
Fu [1  (n  3)Fu] + (n  2)F 2u
1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u
+ (2.A24)
dej
daij
dUi
dej
1  (n  3)Fu + (n  2)Fu
[1  (n  3)Fu   (n  2)F 2u ] [1  (n  2)Fu]
:
One can verify, using Fu < 1n 1 , that agents will provide attention too little with-
out team incentives or relative performance incentives, as the last term of (2.A24)
drops in this case. Intuitively, by having Fu < 1n 1 , we ensured that there is still an
internalization problem in the provision of incentives. To derive the prot maximiz-
ing team incentives or relative performance incentives, we substitute (2.A15) and
(2.A17) into (2.A24), which gives:
wiej = 
s
Gaij() + Faij()

Cejej()
Fuiaij()
[1  (n  2)Fu   (n  1)F 2u ] [1  (n  2)Fu]
1 + Fu
for i 6= j;
when set equal to the rst-best level of attention. The remainder of the generalization
follows from solving (2A.14) for rst-best e¤ort and setting base salaries such that
participation constraints bind.
Chapter 3
Peer Evaluation: Incentives and
Co-worker Relations
3.1 Introduction
In many employment relations managers lack information about employeesindivid-
ual e¤ort or performance; e.g. in highly interdependent work teams, with work on
location, or in case of experts. In an attempt to obtain a more complete picture
of employee performance, many rms have turned to multisource feedback, in busi-
ness better known as 360 evaluations. A 360 evaluation can include performance
assessments by subordinates, peers, supervisors, customers, or other stakeholders.
According to survey data, about 90% of Fortune 1000 rms use some form of mul-
tisource feedback, often including evaluation by peers (Edwards and Ewen 1996).
Moreover, in many companies peer evaluation schemes partially determine person-
nel decisions regarding promotions and performance pay (Bohl 1996).1
Evaluation by peers has intuitive appeal when employees have valuable informa-
tion about one anothers performance. However, when seen from an economic theory
perspective, the widespread use of peer evaluation is less obvious. A major concern
is that employees may benet from providing the employer with invalid performance
1Bohl (1996) nds that one-fth of 750 surveyed companies reports to use peer evaluations, of
which 90% includes the peer evaluation in personnel decisions. Similarly, in a survey among 280
rms, roughly one-fth of the rms have adopted some form of peer evaluation (Antonioni 1996).
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evaluations of their colleagues. For instance, employees can provide invalid ratings
so as to help their friends, hurt their competitors, or game the systemthrough
collusion (Edwards and Ewen 1996 and Kozlowski et al. 1998). In line with this,
Tsui and Barry (1986) nd that performance evaluations are more lenient when
raters experience more personal a¤ect towards the ratee.2 Love (1981) even asserts
that: "The most common rationale given by organizational personnel for avoiding
the use of peer assessment is that it is simply a "popularity contest." " (p. 451).
This chapter develops a formal agency model so as to study when and how peer
evaluation should be used under di¤erent intensities of co-worker relations.
I study peer evaluation in a model of team production by two homogeneous
agents, who are protected by limited liability. The production su¤ers from a pure
moral hazard problem, i.e., the principal is unable to distinguish individual inputs,
and can only o¤er a team bonus for output. A team bonus results in ine¢ ciently
low e¤ort levels, since limited liability makes the budget breaking solution infeasible.
Agents receive a signal about their colleagues e¤ort provision. In an attempt to o¤er
more e¢ cient incentives for e¤ort, the principal employs peer evaluation to gather
the information from these signals. A bonus is paid to those agents that receive a
positve evaluation report. As a starting point I assume ideal circumstances for these
peer evaluations: Agents have an aversion towards lying about their signal. A small
cost of lying is su¢ cient to ensure truthful evaluations, as the agentsreports only
a¤ect the payo¤ of their colleague. Peer evaluation motivates agents to exert e¤ort
so as to increase the likelihood that their co-worker receives a positive signal and
rates performance accordingly. Und er these ideal circumstances, peer evaluation
outperforms a team bonus; in fact, peer evaluation performs as well as individual
incentives would.
Next, I allow for interpersonal relations between colleagues, either good or bad.
Social preferences can give agents an incentive to lie about their signal, i.e., result
in a (dis)likeability bias. In case the internalized utility from a bonus to a friend
outweighs the cost of lying, agents in good relationships give positive evaluations
2Similar signicant correlations between likeability or friendships and leniency in peer evalu-
ation can be found in Sonnentag (1998) and Love (1981). Antonioni and Park (2001) show that
peer evaluations su¤er more from such a likeability bias than traditional performance evaluations.
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regardless of their signal. Likewise, agents in bad relationships may begrudge their
colleague a bonus and lie upon receiving a positive signal. Invalid peer evaluations
also provide incentives for e¤ort, through internalization of a colleagues lying costs.
Prots, however, are usually higher when peer evaluations remain truthful. The
principal can ensure truthful evaluation by adjusting the bonus for peer evaluations
downward, such that co-worker relations do not a¤ect the evaluation decision. Social
preferences, thereby, constrain the e¤ectiveness of peer evaluation. Nevertheless, the
optimal contract always includes peer evaluation. The principal will complement
incentives for e¤ort by including a team bonus in case peer evaluation becomes
severely constrained.
The combination of peer evaluation and a team bonus in the optimal contract
gives an interesting comparative static result regarding how co-worker relations af-
fect prots. The e¤ectiveness of the team bonus increases with better co-worker
relations, as co-worker relations mitigate incentives to free-ride on a colleague. Peer
evaluation su¤ers from more pronounced co-worker relations, through the earlier
discussed likability bias. Taken together, co-worker relations have non-monotonic
e¤ects on prots.
Despite the widespread use of peer evaluation, there are few empirical studies on
its e¤ectiveness. The success of peer evaluation programs is di¢ cult to determine,
since objective performance measures are often lacking, motivating peer assessment
to start with. Peiperl (1999) is one of the few empirical studies that looks into
success factors of peer evaluation in business.3 Managers in a multinational service-
sector organization were asked to identify units with (un)successful peer evaluation.
Successful peer evaluation was positively correlated with a high interdependency of
work within and across units, group components in incentives, the perceived quality
of the ratings, and its integration with rewards. In addition, peer evaluation was
found to be less successful in units that had a very positive group culture, of which
Peiperl says: "an unexpected result that bears some consideration(p. 445). The
likability bias illustrated in this chapter can explain this observation.
3Bamberger et al. (2005) evaluate the impact of a peer assessment program in a kibbutz-
owned manufacturing facility in Israel. The peer evaluations led to an improvement of performance
(measured by supervisory ratings), especially so in the nonanonymous departments.
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The results of this chapter, that better co-worker relations erode peer evaluation,
while they strengthen the e¤ectiveness of a team bonus, are largely in line with nd-
ings by Towry (2003). In a laboratory experiment, she studies how the e¤ectiveness
of these two incentive schemes are inuenced by a team identity manipulation. In
this experiment, participants either receive a compensation based on a colleagues
report about performance, i.e. peer evaluation, or they receive team bonus. Towry
nds that the peer evaluations are undermined by strong team identity, because
team members became more likely to cover for each others shirking behavior. The
team incentive, on the other hand, was more e¤ective in this strong team identity
treatment.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of
the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the set-up of the model, followed by the
analysis in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 contains concluding remarks.
3.2 Related literature
In a pioneering paper, Ma (1988) shows that there exist mechanisms where it is
in the agentsbest interest to report shared information truthfully. Ma considers
a principal who is unable to observe the inputs of a team of agents, while agents
observe each othersactions perfectly. The principal can implement rst-best e¤ort
by asking one agent to report the e¤ort choices of all team members, and giving
other agents the option to challenge this report. There exists a lottery for which the
option to challenge a report is exercised if and only if the report contains a lie. Since
other agents will always challenge a false report, it is optimal for the reporting agent
to state the chosen actions truthfully. The principal, thereby, retrieves the agents
information on individual inputs, which enables him to implement rst-best e¤ort.
This chapter di¤ers from the set-up by Ma in the agentsability to observe each
othersaction: Instead of perfect observability, or an assumption that signals are
su¢ cient statistics for e¤ort (Fischer and Hughes 1997), I assume that agents get
a coarse signal of a colleagues performance. In the set-up I consider, the principal
does not benet from asking agents to report their own e¤ort choice in addition to
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the signal about a co-workers e¤ort. The coarse signals do not allow colleagues to
verify the stated reports perfectly, hence the principal cannot play o¤agentsreports
against each other. As a consequence, agents have no incentive to report their e¤ort
truthfully, rendering the mechanism above infeasible. In many work settings, e.g.,
within health care, consultancy, or academics, the performance assessment by peers
is relevant, yet it is rarely based on perfect information about e¤ort.
Instead of interpersonal relations, Barron and Gupte (2009) focus on other limi-
tations of peer evaluation. The authors introduce harmful consequences of negative
peer appraisals, modelled in two ways: First, negative appraisals make agents less
productive through a drop in team cohesion. Second, agents experience a loss of
utility due to peer pressure. Barron and Gupte show that, in a Ma-type of lottery
for truthtelling, agents need higher compensation to report shirking by a colleague.4
Peer evaluation is no longer guaranteed to be protable under these adverse e¤ects
of a negative appraisal, instead protability depends on the quality of signals among
peers.
Marx and Squintani (2009) also analyze a pure moral hazard problem in team
production, where agents can be given the task to evaluate each other. Without
peer evaluation, the combination of unobservable individual e¤ort choices, and an
inability to punish individuals without proof of shirking behavior, results in low out-
put. The principal can achieve the rst-best outcome with a contract that demands
both high e¤ort and peer monitoring, notwithstanding that monitoring is costly.
The peer monitoring gives an incentive to provide e¤ort, as the principal can now
punish upon observing low output. Punishment is possible, since peer monitoring
provides veriable evidence of shirking, or in case evidence is lacking, agents failed to
monitor. The principal will not punish agents for not monitoring with high output,
because he cannot distinguish between non-monitoring and the absence of evidence
for shirking. Therefore, the agents exert e¤ort and refrain from monitoring in equi-
librium, leading to the rst-best. The authors show that their results are sensitive
to the monitoring technology.
4The lottery o¤ered in Barron and Gupte (2009) plays o¤ the signal that a co-worker receives
against a signal the principal has, while Ma (1988) only uses the information that the agents share.
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3.3 The model
I consider a principal who employs two homogeneous agents, denoted by i and j,
and maximizes the following prot function:
 = qQH  
X
i
[wLi + qw +mjiBi] ; where i 6= j: (3.1)
The principals prot equals output minus wages. Output can be high or low, where
high output has value QH and low output is set to zero. The output realization is
determined by random variable q 2 f0; 1g, where the probability of high output is
increasing in the e¤ort of both agents: Pr(q = 1) = '(ei; ej) = ei+ej.5 The principal
only observes the output level that is realized, i.e., e¤ort choices are unobservable.
Wages can contain a base wage, wLi, a team bonus for high output, w, and a
bonus for the receipt of a positive peer evaluation, Bi.6 Wages are subject to a
limited-liability constraint: The wage cannot be negative in any state of the world.
This gives the following limited-liability constraints:
wLi  0; wLi +Bi  0; wLi +w  0; wLi +Bi +w  0: (3.2)
Agents maximize the following utility function:
Ui = wLi + qw +mjiBi   C(ei)   jmij   sijj+ Uj: (3.3)
Utility is increasing in the wage and decreasing with costs of e¤ort. For convenience,
I assume quadratic costs of e¤ort: C(ei) = 12e
2
i . The principal asks agents to eval-
uate the performance of their colleague: Agent i sends an evaluation message to
5The assumption of a probabilistic team output is not essential, it is important that individual
inputs are unobservable to the principal. It does simplify the analysis by the reduction of the
number of possible team bonuses. Further, it creates the need for a restriction on QH , or on the
cost of e¤ort, such that high output with certainty is not pre¤ered over the optimal contract.
6Hereby, I restrict my attention to a limited class of contracts. I consider the performance of
the least sophisticated form of peer evaluation incentives, where the peer evaluation bonus only
depends on the report by a colleague. This may not be without loss of generality: In a more
general setting, the principal could specify a contract wi(mij ;mji; q), which would allow for 8
possible bonus payments in the binary setting that I analyse. The optimal contract for more
sophisticated peer evaluation schemes, i.e., where payments depend on the interaction of reports
and team outcomes, is left for further research.
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the principal about agent js performance, denoted by mij. Agents can base their
evaluation on a signal they receive about their colleagues e¤ort level. The signal,
sij 2 f0; 1g, takes on zero when agent i perceives js e¤ort is below some standard
and one if j performed well according to i. The probability of a high signal depends
on the colleagues e¤ort, Pr(sij = 1) = p(ej) = ej. I assume that there are some
costs of deviating from ones signal, or  > 0. These costs can stem from the time
and energy spent to misrepresent information (Kartik 2009). Besides this, many
people bear a psychological costs of lying (Gneezy 2005, Hurkens and Kartik 2009,
Fischbacher and Heusi 2008). The last term in the utility function captures social
preferences in the workplace. A positive  captures altruism, whereas a negative 
represents feelings of spite. As a consequence of the homogeneity assumption,  can
also be interpreted as the quality of a relationship between colleagues. Substitution
of Uj into (3.3) gives:
Ui =
1
1  2
8<: wLi + qw +mjiBi   C(ei)   jmij   sijj+ [wLj + qw +mijBj   C(ej)   jmji   sjij]
9=; ;
where  is restricted to  1 <  < 1, to ensure an interior solution.7
The timing of the game is as follows: First, there is a contracting stage, where
the agents can accept or reject the o¤ered contract. Next, each agent chooses e¤ort.
Finally, the agents receive a signal about their co-workers e¤ort level and send an
evaluation message to the principal, after which output is realized and the contracts
are executed.
3.4 Analysis
In a situation without peer evaluation, the principal can only use the team bonus to
stimulate e¤ort provision. The team bonus su¤ers from a well-known internalization
7The term 11 2 is like a social multiplier of utility. In case of positive relations, agent i not
only enjoys the utility of j, but also that j values is well-being. In case of bad relations, js utility
enters as a cost in Ui. However, is fortune also makes j less well o¤, so that is privateutility is
again amplied. Still, if agents are identical, the latter e¤ect is second-order, and agents are worse
o¤ with bad co-worker relations. At the end of section 3.4, I will discuss comparative statics with
respect to .
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problem; as the agentscosts of e¤ort are private, while the benets are not fully
internalized, the free-rider problem arises. Still, the principal can achieve rst-best
prots with a team bonus when budget breaking is possible (Holmstrom, 1982).
The principal pays the full marginal product to both agents, and achieves rst-best
prots through a negative base wage. This solution is not feasible here, as agents
are assumed to be limitedly liable. Hence, a team bonus cannot implement rst-best
e¤ort. Next, let us see whether it is possible to improve upon the team bonus by
peer evaluations.
The game is solved backwards, starting with the peer evaluation stage. As a
consequence of the binary signal, the principal believes at best two messages in
equilibrium, mij 2 f0; 1g.8 Agents choose the evaluation message that maximizes
their utility. A low evaluation brings a cost of lying in case the received signal
was high. Similarly, giving a high evaluation brings a cost of lying when the signal
was low, and it leads to a bonus for the colleague. The agents evaluation remains
truthful (mij = sij), as long as mij = 0 is preferred for sij = 0:
Ui(mij = 0)  Ui(mij = 1)  0; which holds for    Bj  0;
and mij = 1 is preferred with sij = 1:
Ui(mij = 1)  Ui(mij = 0)  0, which holds for  + Bj  0:
Obviously, without social preferences (i.e.,  = 0), the assumption of lying costs
leads to a truthful revelation of ones signal. However, once we allow for co-worker
relations, agents may have an incentive to lie. Namely, the bonus for a positive
evaluation gives an internalized benet or cost depending on the agents social pref-
erences. Agents in good relationships may want to lie when receiving a low signal
about their colleagues performance: In case the utility of a bonus for a friend out-
weighs the lying costs, agents give each other positive evaluations irrespective of the
received signal. Likewise, colleagues in a bad relationship may want to lie in case of
8For other messages, I assume that the principal believes the agent received a low signal, and
awards no bonus.
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a positive signal, as they begrudge the bonus to a disliked colleague. Truthful eval-
uation is thereby constrained to   
B
   
B
; i.e., when agents have weak social
preferences, high costs of lying, or there is a small bonus for a positive evaluation.
Lemma 3.1 summarizes an agents evaluation strategy:
Lemma 3.1 Agent is evaluation strategy is: mij =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if  <   
Bj
sij if   
Bj
   
Bj
1 if  >

Bj
.
The evaluation process is truthful when agents have weak social preferences, high
lying costs, or small benets from a positive evaluation. This translates into a con-
straint on the bonus for the receipt of a positive peer evaluation under which peer
evaluations remain truthful:
B  jj : (3.4)
In the preceding stage agents choose their e¤ort levels. The rst-order condition
for e¤ort is the following:
(1  2)dUi
dei
= (1 + )'ei()w   Cei() +
dUi
dPr(sji = 1)
dPr(sji = 1)
dei
= 0:
E¤ort provision increases with the team bonus for high output, while it decreases
with the marginal costs of e¤ort. The team bonus also a¤ects the income of a
colleague. The latter e¤ect can be an additional benet or costs of e¤ort depending
on agent is social preferences. The team bonus provides stronger incentives when
agent i is altruistic towards j, while e¤ort provision is suppressed when i is spiteful
towards j. The last term in the rst-order condition captures incentives for e¤ort
from peer evaluation. The expectation that a co-worker receives a positive signal is
increasing in e¤ort, dPr(sji=1)
dei
= pei() = 1. A change in the co-workers signal a¤ects
utility as follows:
dUi
dPr(sji = 1)
=
8>><>>:
  if mij = 0
Bi if mij = sij
 if mij = 1
: (3.5)
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Combined, these terms give two incentive e¤ects. First, in case of truthful peer eval-
uation, e¤ort is stimulated by the peer evaluation bonus. Agents desire to increase
the likelihood that their colleague receives a positive signal and rates performance
accordingly, such that the bonus is obtained. Second, under non-truthful peer evalu-
ation there is also an incentive for e¤ort, despite that the signal about a co-workers
performance is ignored in the evaluation decision. Altruistic agents wish to increase
the probability that their colleague receives a positive signal, such that the expected
lying costs for this colleague are lower. Likewise, spiteful agents can increase the
lying costs of a colleague by increasing the probability of a positive signal. The
incentives from non-truthful peer evaluation are weaker than those of the maximum
bonus under truthful peer evaluation:
B =

jj > jj  as jj < 1:
For non-truthful peer evaluation the bonus for receiving a positive evaluation does
not give incentives for e¤ort itself, however the bonus should be su¢ ciently large to
give rise to non-truthful peer evaluation strategies.9 It is evident that non-truthful
peer evaluations is unattractive to the principal when co-worker relations are good,
as the incentives are weaker and the higher B always needs to be paid. In case of bad
co-worker relations, the non-truthful equilibrium has potential to be more protable,
as the peer evaluation bonus is never paid. Nonetheless, the principal often achieves
higher prots with truthful peer evaluation, for which a su¢ cient condition is:
 >  1
2
(1 + )QH ; (3.6)
see the appendix for the proof. In case this condition does not hold, the principal may
want to exploit a bad relationship between agents by setting a high peer evaluation
bonus, which is never paid. As described before, agents have an incentive to work,
because they can increase the expected lying costs of a disliked colleague. In the
9Note that, peer evaluation without a bonus, or Bi = 0, gives no incentive for e¤ort. De-
velopmental peer evaluation, or peer evaluation without compensation, is a much used tool, but
without value in the setting I study. Recently, Gupte (2009) presents a model of developmental
peer evaluation, where peer evaluation is used as an input to determine a suitable training.
3.4 Analysis 47
remainder of this chapter I will assume that (3.6) holds, since the practical relevance
of this non-truthful equilibrium is to my opinion limited. Consequently, we can focus
on the optimal e¤ort choice under truthful peer evaluation. In combination with the
assumptions on '() and C(), the rst-order condition for e¤ort implies that agent
is optimal e¤ort under truthful peer evaluation equals:
ei = (1 + )w +Bi: (3.7)
Summarizing the above: E¤ort can be stimulated through a team bonus and a bonus
for receiving a positive peer evaluation. The e¤ectiveness of the team bonus depends
on an agents social preferences. The free-rider problem, inherent to a team bonus, is
less severe when co-worker relations are good. The free-rider problem is exacerbated
for bad co-worker relations, as agents begrudge their colleague the fruits of their
labour. Further, a bonus for the receipt of a positive peer evaluation stimulates
e¤ort provision, because e¤ort inuences a colleagues expected evaluation message
under truthful peer evaluation.
Finally, the principal sets the prot maximizing contracts subject to the incen-
tive compatibility constraints (3.7), the limited-liability constraints (3.2), and the
constraint for truthful peer evaluation (3.4). Naturally, the principal does not need
to abide to this last constraint (3.4). The inclusion of this constraint helps to charac-
terize the optimal contract, but is innocuous, as the principal cannot do better with
non-truthful peer evaluation when (3.6) holds. Together, this gives the principals
optimization problem:
max
wLi;w;Bi;Bj
 = '() [QH   2w]  wLi   wLj   E(mij)Bj   E(mji)Bi;
s.t. wLi  0; wLi +Bi  0; wLi +w  0; wLi +Bi +w  0; Bi  jj ;
The rst limited-liability constraint will bind, as there is no incentive for e¤ort from
the base wage. Hence, we get wLi = 0. The last limited-liability constraint is
satised by a combination of the former constraints. This reduces the optimization
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problem to:
max
w;Bi;Bj
 = '() [QH   2w]  wLi   wLj   E(mij)Bj   E(mji)Bi; (3.8)
s.t. w  0; Bi  0; Bi  jj ;
leading to the second-best contract described in Proposition 3.1:
Proposition 3.1 Under assumption (3.6), the optimal contract under limited lia-
bility is characterized by:
Bi = Bj =
1
2
QH and w = 0; if   1
2
jjQH ; (A)
Bi = Bj =

jj and w = 0; if
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
   1
2
jjQH ; (B)
Bi = Bj =

jj and w =
QH
4
  (3 + )
4(1 + ) jaj ; if  <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
: (C)
The proof can be found in the appendix. The optimal contract always includes
a bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation. The principal can ensure peer eval-
uation remains truthful, by satisfying constraint (3.4). This allows the principal to
o¤er individual incentives for e¤ort through Bi, even though he does not observe
the individual contributions himself. Hence, unlike the team bonus, the peer evalu-
ation bonus does not su¤er from an internalization problem, which makes it a more
cost-e¤ective way to stimulate e¤ort.
Part (A) of Proposition 3.1 shows the optimal contract under ideal circumstances
for peer evaluation, i.e. su¢ ciently high cost of lying or weak social preferences. In
this situation, the peer evaluation bonus performs as well as providing the agents
with individual incentives under limited liability. Smaller lying costs or more pro-
nounced social preferences constrain the peer evaluation bonus at some point, de-
scribed by contract (B). Eventually, the principal will nd it optimal to complement
incentives for e¤ort with a team bonus, as indicated by contract (C) in Proposition
3.1.
The comparative statics of  and  with respect to the peer evaluation bonus
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and the team bonus are described by Corollary 3.1:
Corollary 3.1 In contracts (B) and (C), the bonus for the receipt of a positive
peer evaluation is increasing in lying costs and social preferences that become less
pronounced:
@B
@
=
1
jj > 0;
@B
@
=   jj3 :
In contract (C), the team bonus is decreasing with the costs of lying, and social
preferences have an ambiguous e¤ect on the team bonus:
@w
@
=  @B
@
(3 + )
4(1 + )
< 0;
@w
@
=  @B
@
(3 + )
4(1 + )
+
1
2(1 + )2

jj : (3.9)
Otherwise, lying costs and social preferences do not a¤ect compensation in the second-
best contract.
The comparative static result with respect to the peer evaluation bonus follows
from Lemma 3.1. That is, decreasing costs of lying and more pronounced co-worker
relations constrain the peer evaluation bonus. Corollary 3.1 shows a negative relation
between lying costs and the team bonus. A decrease in the costs of lying paralyzes
peer evaluation, making it optimal to enhance e¤ort provision with a higher team
bonus (provided that lying costs are su¢ ciently low). Social preferences have a
twofold inuence on the strength of the team bonus, as can be seen from (3.9). First,
like with lying costs, stronger social preferences constrain the bonus for receiving a
positive peer evaluation. More pronounced co-worker relations, whether negative or
positive, thereby add to the importance of the team bonus. Second, social preferences
also inuence the incentive e¤ects of a team bonus, as we already observed in (3.7).
For altruistic agents better co-worker relations strengthen the team bonus by both
e¤ects. The two e¤ects are in conict for bad co-worker relations that become worse,
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Figure 3.1: Team bonus in the optimal contract for di¤erent (; ) combinations,
with QH = 13 .
which leads to a decrease of the team bonus at some point for more spiteful agents.
The optimal team bonus in the second-best contract is depicted in Figure 3.1 for
di¤erent (; ) combinations, with QH = 13 . Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 do so for the
expected prots and expected utility.10 The comparative statics for the expected
prots and expected utility can be found in the appendix.
As long as peer evaluation is unrestricted (A), the expected prots are constant.
In contract (B), lower lying costs and more pronounced co-worker relations hurt prof-
its, through the smaller incentive e¤ect of the peer evaluations. Finally, in contract
(C), the size of the peer evaluation bonus and the team bonus are both inuenced by
 and . A decrease of the lying costs leads to a shift in the compensation towards the
team bonus. This shift hurts prots, as the peer evaluation bonus stimulates e¤ort
in a more cost-e¤ective way than the team bonus does, so prots are still increasing
in  under contract (C). There is a similar e¤ect of more pronounced co-worker re-
lations, a shift away from the peer evaluation bonus has a negative e¤ect on prots.
10The gures are qualitatively the same for other levels of QH . The su¢ cient condition for
optimality of truthful peer evaluation (3.6) does not hold for some (; ) combinations in the
upper left corners in Figure 3.1 to 3.3, in which case the optimal contract may look di¤erent.
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Figure 3.2: Expected prots under the optimal contract for di¤erent (; ) combi-
nations, with QH = 13 .
Figure 3.3: Expected utility in the optimal contract for di¤erent (; ) combinations,
with QH = 13 .
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In addition, better co-worker relations soften the free-rider problem, which has a
favorable e¤ect on prots. Prots are increasing in  with bad co-worker relations,
as both e¤ects work in the same direction. For good co-worker relations, prots are
decreasing in  at rst, as the shift away from peer evaluation dominates the e¤ect
of a softened free-rider problem. However, the prots pick up again from some point,
as the e¤ect on the free-rider problem becomes more prominent for a larger team
bonus. Summarizing, under truthful peer evaluation, bad co-worker relations that
become worse are never good for prots, while improving good co-worker relations
can be bad.
Agents are left with rents due to the limited liability assumption. Lying costs
only a¤ect utility through the o¤ered contract, since there is no lying in equilibrium.
Therefore, utility is constant in  for unrestricted peer evaluation (A). Co-worker
relations, on the other hand, have a direct and positive e¤ect on utility, as already
noted in footnote 7. In contract (B), an increase in the lying costs relaxes the con-
straint on the peer evaluation bonus, and thereby leads to a higher utility. Similarly,
besides the direct e¤ect on utility, co-worker relations a¤ect the size of the peer eval-
uation bonus. The expected utility is increasing in , except for moderately positive
co-worker relations (0 <  < 2
3
), where the decrease in the peer evaluation bonus
outweighs the direct e¤ect of having better co-worker relations. Finally, in contract
(C), higher lying costs cause a shift in the optimal compensation towards peer eval-
uation, as noticed before. This shift away from the team bonus hurts the agents
utility, as the team bonus comes with higher rents. A change in  also has this e¤ect,
in addition to the direct e¤ect on utility and the e¤ect on the free-rider problem.
The latter two e¤ects make the utility increasing in co-worker relations, whereas the
rst e¤ect is negative for  < 0 and can dominate for moderately negative co-worker
relations.
3.5 Concluding remarks
Peer evaluation has intuitive appeal in work environments where co-workers are in
the best position to monitor each other. However, there is a concern that these
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performance evaluations by peers are susceptible to a likeability bias. I have studied
the possibility to include peer evaluation in performance pay under di¤erent intensi-
ties of co-worker relations, using a model of team production by two limitedly liable
agents. The principal only observes the team output, while agents receive a signal
about a colleagues e¤ort, allowing for peer evaluation in addition to a team bonus.
The combination of a cost of lying about the received signal and interpersonal rela-
tions between co-workers determine the agents evaluation decision. Lying costs lead
to a truthful revelation of signals, while the internalization of a bonus to a colleague
may cause a bias. Nevertheless, the optimal contract always includes a bonus for re-
ceiving a positive peer evaluation, which may be complemented with a team bonus.
Truthful peer evaluation has incentive e¤ects, as agents desire to increase the likeli-
hood that their colleague receives a positive signal. Social preferences constrain the
bonus for a positive evaluation so as to keep revelation of signals truthful, leading to
the testable implication that incentive e¤ects of peer evaluation diminish with more
pronounced social relations between co-workers. A managerial implication of this
result is that managers should assign employees that are rather indi¤erent towards
one another to evaluate each others performance.
There is debate in the management literature and organizational psychology
whether peer evaluations should only be used for developmental purposes, or whether
they can also be used to determine merit pay and promotions (see among others
Edwards and Ewen 1996, Coates 1998, Fleenor and Brutus 2001). I contribute
to this debate by showing that some concerns of intergrating peer evaluation with
performance pay can be overcome. Namely, by setting a smaller bonus for peer
evaluation, it is possible to avoid a (dis)likability bias. In addition, I illustrated
that even non-truthful peer evaluations can have incentive e¤ects. The distinction
between developmental peer evaluation and its integration with rewards, however,
may be less strict in practice: In case a manager is supposed to serve as a coach,
it is unlikely that the information resulting from peer evaluations is neglected in
determining promotions and pay (Edwards and Ewen 1996). The consequences
of including peer evaluation in performance pay, therefore, deserve more research
attention.
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There are a number of other factors that may lead to intentional distortions in
peer evaluation. Peer evaluation between colleagues in promotion tournaments will
most likely lead to a downward bias in the evaluation reports, in order to boost ones
own chances of winning. Carpenter et al. (2010) provide evidence for this subtle
way of sabotaging competitors in a real e¤ort experiment, where the anticipation of
sabotage eliminates the incentives to work in this tournament. A special case of peer
evaluation is where incumbents determine their future co-workers, or competitors for
future promotions, as incumbents may be most capable in evaluating the quality of
applicants. Carmichael (1988) showed that in such a setting incumbents discrimi-
nate against the best possible candidates, unless the incumbentsfuture income is
ensured, which is sometimes only possible by o¤ering tenure. Another concern is
that colleagues may try to collude with their evaluations against the principal in
repeated interactions.
The result that a principal always wants to make use of peer evaluations is at
odds with its occurrence in practice. However, the prerequisite that co-workers have
valuable information on employee performance does not apply to all organizations.
Further, it is conceivable that peer evaluation has an inuence on interpersonal rela-
tionships. Chapter 2 showed that, under the assumption of conditionally altruistic or
reciprocal preferences, externalities in wages may motivate people to invest in their
relationships with colleagues. In line with this, peer evaluation may be a good rea-
son to invest in the relationship with a colleague that evaluates ones performance,
so as to increase the likelihood of a positive evaluation by this colleague. By this
logic the e¤ectiveness of peer evaluation may deteriorate eventually. In combination
with some of the additional concerns named above, this o¤ers an explanation for
the gap between the theoretical prediction and the prevalence of peer evaluations in
practice.
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3.A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The agentse¤ort choices (3.7) are substituted into '() and E(mij) = p(), which
gives the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the principals optimization problem
(3.8):
d
dw
= 2(1 + )QH   8(1 + )w   (3 + )Bi   (3 + )Bj + 1  0;
w  0; w d
dw
= 0; 1  0; 1w = 0;
d
dBi
= QH   (3 + )w   2Bi + 2   3  0; Bi  0; Bi d
dBi
= 0;
2  0; 2Bi = 0; Bi   jj  0; 3  0; 3

Bi   jj

= 0;
d
dBj
= QH   (3 + )w   2Bj + 4   5  0; Bj  0; Bj d
dBj
= 0;
4  0; 4Bi = 0; Bj   jj  0; 5  0; 5

Bj   jj

= 0:
We look for a solution where Bi = Bj, as agents are homogeneous. Further, as the
constraints on the peer evaluation bonus can never bind at the same time, the cases
that need be checked are reduced to six: (i) none of the constraints is binding, (ii)
w = 0, and Bi = Bj = 0, (iii) w > 0 and Bi = Bj = 0, (iv) w = 0 and
constraints on Bi = Bj are non-binding, (v) w > 0 and Bi = Bj =

jj , and (vi)
w = 0 and Bi = Bj =

jj .
The rst three cases cannot be part of the optimal contract: (i) i = 0, for which
the rst-order conditions solve for w = QH
1  ; and Bi = Bj =   (1+)QH1  < 0, which
contradicts Bi  0. (ii) w = Bi = Bj = 0, contradicts 1  0 and ddw  0
being valid at the same time. (iii) d
dw
= 0; 1 = 0; and Bi = Bj = 0 give
w = 1
4
QH , but also gives: ddBi =
d
dBj
= 1
4
(1   )QH + 2;4, which contradicts
d
dBi
= d
dBj
 0, as  1 <  < 1. The next three cases jointly characterize the
optimal contract: (iv) d
dBi
= d
dBj
= 0 and 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 = 0 give Bj =
1
2
QH , all conditions are satised as long as

jj 
1
2
QH  0, otherwise Bi will hit
either constraint, which leads to contradiction. This case leads to the rst line
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in Proposition 1. (v) d
dw
= 0; and 1 = 0 gives w = 14QH  
(3 + )
4(1 + ) jaj , all
conditions are satised as long as  <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
otherwise w  0 which gives
a contradiction. This case gives the third line in Proposition 1. (vi) d
dw
 0; and
1  0 give   (1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
, otherwise the two cannot be satised simultaneously,
and d
dBi
= d
dBj
= 0 together with 2 = 4 = 0, and 3 = 5  0 give that jj 
1
2
QH
otherwise a contradiction follows. This gives the second line in Proposition 1 and
completes the characterization of the optimal contract.
To complete the proof of the optimal contract we need to compare the prots
under truthful peer evaluation with the prots of peer evaluation that is not truthful.
For non-truthful peer evaluation under good co-worker relations (mij = 1), the
principal always has to pay a higher peer evaluation bonus, while incentives are
weaker. Therefore, it is evident that this decreases the principals prots. The
non-truthful evaluation strategy for bad co-worker relations (mij = 0) seems more
promising, as the principal never has to pay the peer evaluation bonus. The size of
the peer evaluation bonus therefore does not matter for prots, it should only be
su¢ ciently high so as to give rise to the non-truthful peer evaluation strategy. The
principal still needs to nd the optimal team bonus. For mij = 0 the agents optimal
e¤ort is:
ei = (1 + )w   ;
leading to:
d
dw
= (1 + ) [QH   4w] + 2 = 0;
an optimal team bonus under mij = 0:
w = 1
4
QH +

2(1 + )
if  >  1
2
QH(1 + );
w = 0 if  <  1
2
QH(1 + );
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and giving prots:
 = 1
4
(1 + )Q2H   QH +
22
(1 + )
if  >  1
2
QH(1 + );
 =  2QH if  <  1
2
QH(1 + ).
The prots under the weakest form of truthful peer evaluation ( <
(1 + ) jjQH
3 + 
)
are described by:
 = 1
4
(1 + )Q2H +
(1  )
2 jaj QH +
(1  )22
4(1 + ) jaj2 ;
which are strictly higher than the prots under mij = 0 with  >  12QH(1 + ):
(mij = sij)  (mij = 0) = (1  )
2 jaj QH +
(1  )22
4(1 + ) jaj2 + QH  
22
(1 + )
> 0
)

1
2
(1  ) jj + 

QH +
1
(1 + )
"
1
2
(1  ) jj
2
  ()2
#
> 0
) 1
2
(1  ) jj >   )  [1  + 2 jj] > 0) 1  + 2 jj > 0
)  >  1;
which is satised by assumption. In case  <  1
2
QH(1 + ), the prots for non-
truthful peer evaluation can be higher than those under truthful peer evaluation.
The principal does not have to pay any wages in this case. He exploits the bad
relationship between the agents by awarding a high peer evaluation bonus, which
he never has to pay. Agents exert e¤ort to increase their disliked colleagues lying
costs. For extreme lying costs, the principal can obtain high output with certainty
for free.
Comparative statics for expected prots and expected utility
The expected prots under truthful peer evaluation can be written as:
E() = 2 [(1 + )w +B] [QH   2w  B] : (B1)
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By substituting the optimal contract into (B1) gives:
E() =
1
2
Q2H ;
for contract (A), leading to the comparative static e¤ects :
@E()
@
=
@E()
@
= 0:
Similar, for contract (B) we obtain:
E() = 2

jj

QH   jj

;
and:
@E()
@
=
2
jj

QH   2 jj

> 0;
@E()
@
=  2jj3

QH   2 jj

;
as comparative static results. Expected prots are increasing in  for contract (B), as

jj <
1
2
QH . Likewise, expected prots are increasing in  for  < 0, and decreasing
in  for  > 0, i.e., expected prots decrease with more pronounced co-worker
relation. The expected prots under contract (C) are:
E() = 2

(1 + )QH
4
+
(1  )
4 jaj
 
QH
2
+
(1  )
2(1 + ) jaj

;
which gives comparative static results:
@E()
@
=
(1  )QH
2 jaj +
(1  )2
2(1 + ) jaj2 > 0;
@E()
@
=   jj3

(1  )QH
2
+
(1  )2
2(1 + ) jj

+ 2w [QH   2w  B] :
Expected prots are increasing in , as lying costs shift compensation towards a
higher peer evaluation bonus, which is a more cost-e¤ective manner of stimulating
e¤ort. Co-worker relations have two e¤ects on prots: First, as before, co-worker
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relations a¤ect expected prots through a change in the peer evaluation bonus.
Second, better co-worker relations increase the e¤ectiveness of the team bonus. Ex-
pected prots are increasing in , except for moderately positive co-worker relations,
as the e¤ect through the peer evaluation bonus dominates the favorable e¤ect on
the free-rider problem for a small team bonus.
The comparative static e¤ects with respect to expected utility are best shown
when we rewrite (3.3) slightly. A substitution of Uj into is utility function, in
combination with the homogeneity assumption, gives:
E(U) =
1
1   ['()w + p()B   C()]
=
1
1  

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

:
The expected utility under contract (A) is:
E(U) =
1
1  
Q2H
8
;
which yields the following comparative statics:
@E(U)
@
= 0;
@E(U)
@
=
1
(1  )2
Q2H
8
> 0:
Contract (B) gives expected utility:
E(U) =
1
1  
1
2
2
jj2 ;
and comparative statics:
@E(U)
@
=

(1  ) jj2 > 0;
@E(U)
@
=
2
(1  ) jj2

1
2(1  )  

jj2

:
In contract (B), the expected utility is increasing in , except for 0 <  < 2
3
. Finally,
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the expected utility in contract (C) equals:
E(U) =
1
1  

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

=
1
32(1  )

(3  )QH   (5 + )(1  )
(1 + ) jj
 
(1 + )QH +
(1  )
jj

and comparative static analysis gives:
@E(U)
@
=   1
1  
@B
@

(1  )B
2(1 + )
+
(1  2)w
4

< 0
@E(U)
@
=   1
1  
@B
@

(1  )B
2(1 + )
+
(1  2)w
4

+
B [(3  )(1 + )w + 2B]
2(1  )2
+
1
(1  )2

1
2
B2 + 2Bw +
1
2
(3  )(1 + )w2

Expected utility is decreasing in the lying costs. Although higher lying costs allow
for a higher peer evaluation bonus, which increases rents as we saw in contract (B),
the team bonus decreases simultaneously, which has a stronger e¤ect on workers
rents. There is a similar e¤ect on utility for co-worker relations. As these become
more pronounced, compensation shifts towards a higher team bonus, denoted by the
rst term. This term is negative for  < 0 and positive for  > 0. Further, utility
increases in the co-worker relations through a softened free-rider problem and the
direct e¤ect on utility, captured by the second and third term respectively. In sum,
utility is increasing in , excepts for some moderately negative co-worker relations,
where the rst term dominates.
Chapter 4
A Field Experiment on Team
Incentives and Peer Pressure
Joint with Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, Okemena Onemu and Willem Verbeke.
4.1 Introduction
Team incentives are a widely used means of stimulating and rewarding employees
performance (Ledfort et al. 1995, CIPD 2010). Sometimes, the nature of the produc-
tion process makes that team-based pay is the best or only way to reward employees
for performance, for instance when team performance is much easier to assess than
individual performance. In other cases, organizations use team incentives so as to
avoid inequity and rivalry at the workplace that individual performance pay may
bring about.
A well-known problem with team incentives is free-riding (Holmstrom 1982).
That is, each individual employee has a too strong incentive to slack o¤ as the
benets from working hard (the team rewards) are shared with all team members,
while the costs of working hard are borne individually.1
1Perhaps the cleanest evidence of such free riding in a eld context is provided by Erev et al.
(1993) who study incentives for orange-pickers in Israel. They show that production is 25% higher
under individual performance pay than under an equivalent incentive based on performance of a
team of four workers. See also Gneezy et al. (2004).
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The literature has suggested several ways in which employees can alleviate such
free-rider problems, ranging from punishing or pressuring shirking colleagues to en-
couraging and helping them. Employees who observe the behavior of their peers
can exercise pressure on those colleagues that do not reach the group norm, e.g.,
by shaming or other forms of punishment (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Thus, peer
pressure can make groups more productive. However, as most people do not enjoy
the act of punishing (let alone enjoy being punished), peer pressure also involves
a cost to employees (Barron and Gjerde 1997). Employees also have more friendly
options to alleviate free-riding in teams. For instance, helping a less productive col-
league can foster cooperation (Fitzroy and Kraft 1986, Drago and Turnbull 1988).
Besides helping, employees may actively invest in the quality of co-worker relations,
as colleagues who care about one another have less incentive to free ride (Rotemberg
1994, Chapter 2). The two extremes of such anti-shirking behavior, peer pressure
and relationship-building, can have opposite implications for employee welfare, and
for co-worker relations in particular.
This chapter presents a eld experiment designed to test a few basic hypotheses
on team incentives, peer pressure, and co-worker relations. We ran a eld experiment
in a retail chain consisting of 128 stores. We introduced short-term team incentives
in a random sample of these stores. To assess co-worker relationships and employees
inclinations to exert peer pressure, we conducted questionnaires among employees
in all stores both before the experiment started and after the experiment ended. We
examine whether the e¤ect of team incentives on performance increases in the quality
of co-worker relations prior to the experiment and in employeespre-experimental
stated willingness to take action upon observing a shirking colleague. Further, by
comparing questionnaire responses before and after the experiment, we examine how
team incentives a¤ect the quality of co-worker relations and employeesintentions to
exert peer pressure in the future. Lastly, using these exogenously induced variations,
we study how peer pressure and the quality of co-worker relations a¤ect employees
performance.
Our results are as follows. First, we do not nd a signicant average treatment
e¤ect of the team incentive on sales performance. Next, we allow for heterogeneous
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treatment e¤ects. Our ndings suggest that the team incentive has a stronger e¤ect
for stores with a strong anti-shirking culture or better co-worker relations. Even
though this observation is in line with the theories set forth above, it cannot be
considered as evidence under conventional measures of statistical signicance.
Unfortunately we cannot conclude much from our rst nding that the team
incentive had no signicant e¤ect on sales performance, because, with hindsight, the
targets we set were most likely to be too ambitious. Stores in the treatment could
earn a team bonus by increasing the number of goods sold per purchase above a
store specic target. This target was set 10% above the average number of goods
sold per purchase during the previous month. In retrospect this target may have
been too ambitious. For stores in the control group, the number of goods sold
per purchase were lower as compared to the month used to set the targets. These
unfavorable circumstances added to the di¢ culty of reaching the target. Only one
out of the sixty stores in the treatment managed to obtain the team bonus, making
it questionable whether the team bonus gave stores an incentive to increase sales
e¤ort. Our additional ndings also have to be seen in this light.
Our second nding comes from comparing questionnaire responses before and
after the experiment. We nd that the quality of co-worker relations signicantly
deteriorated in response to the treatment. Further, the short-run team incentive led
to a signicant reduction in post-experimental willingness to exert peer pressure.
Our questionnaire data also hint at the reason for this reduction. Employees in the
team bonus treatment report more often that the colleague to whom peer pressure
was directed reacted with remorse and that it less often led to an improvement of the
colleagues behavior. Taken together, it seems plausible that employees in treated
stores exercised more peer pressure during the experiment with unsatisfactory re-
sults, lowering the willingness to undertake such behavior in the future. It is unlikely
that we picked up a general disappointment for treated stores in the second ques-
tionnaire, as we show that job satisfaction and employee-manager relations were not
a¤ected by the temporary team incentive.
Third, our design arguably allows for an investigation of the e¤ect of peer pres-
sure and co-worker relations on performance. The treatment can be seen as an
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instrument for peer pressure and co-worker relations, as it should be unrelated to
post-experimental performance. However, we do not nd any di¤erence in post-
experimental performance between the control group and treated stores.
There are a number of empirical studies on the e¤ects of peer pressure that are
related to our study. In an observational study, Mas and Moretti (2009) make use
of detailed scanner data from a supermarket chain and show that social pressure
increases productivity. The authors exploit information on the spatial arrangement
of cashier seating and show that cashiers raise their productivity when they are
being observed by a more productive colleague. The increase cannot stem from
pro-social behavior, as the productivity of colleagues a cashier observes turns out
not to matter for productivity. Falk and Ichino (2006) nd a similar peer e¤ect in
a controlled eld experiment, where students ll envelopes, either alone or in pairs.
They nd that productivity is higher in the pairs treatment, and more similar within
a pair; that is, the standard deviations of productivity are lower within pairs than
within hypothetical pairs formed from subjects in the singles treatment. Bandiera
et al. (2010) study workers at a fruit farm and nd that workers who are socially
connected tend to conform to a common productivity norm. On average, social ties
among workers turn out not to a¤ect productivity.
The questionnaire that we use is for a large part based on Freeman et al. (2010).
Freeman et al. (2010) included the questions in two surveys: The General Social
Survey (2002 and 2006) held among a representative sample of workers throughout
the US, and a special NBER survey among 14 companies that have some form of
group incentives.2 In both surveys, a majority of the workers state that they would
take action upon observing a shirking colleague. Freeman et al. (2010) nd that
such behavior is more likely when team incentives are present. Further, they nd
in establishments where employees are more inclined to take action, employees also
report that colleagues work harder. Whether this is a causal relation, however, is not
obvious from non-experimental data. Our study extends the analysis by Freeman et
al. (2010) by exploiting our experimental setup. Further, we use actual performance
data rather than (self-)reported performance data.
2Freeman et al. (2008) use a similar questionnaire in a single multinational rm to examine
cross-country di¤erences in labor practices.
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We proceed as follows. In the next section, we describe the experimental set-up
and Section 4.3 provides the data description. We briey describe the methodology
of our empirical analysis in Section 4.4 and the results are reported in Section 4.5.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Experimental set-up
The eld experiment took place during the Fall of 2009 within a retail chain that
sells clothing, shoes, and sports apparel. The retail chain consists of 128 stores;
all stores operate under one brand and are geographically dispersed throughout
The Netherlands. The company employed around 1300 store employees during our
experimental period. Most of the store employees are sales clerks, whose primary
tasks consist of assisting customers to make purchases. Store employees earn a
xed hourly wage slightly above the legal minimum, and are not provided with any
monetary incentives other than the rewards provided during the experiment. Store
managers earn about 50% more than regular employees, and their pay is partly
determined by store performance. Recently, the companys management started
to explore possibilities to o¤er incentives to all employees. The results of an earlier
experiment with incentives for store employees in the same retail chain are described
in Chapter 5.3
In the current experimental treatment, stores could earn a team bonus by raising
the average number of items sold per purchase over a six week period. The number of
items sold per purchase has a low volatility in comparison to other sales performance
measures, which made it an attractive measure to base an absolute target on.4
Futhermore, this measure gives employees a clear idea how they can contribute.
Treated stores could earn one of two monetary rewards by increasing the average
number of items sold per purchase by 10 or 20 percent as compared to their previous
3The earlier experiment explored the e¤ects of sales contests among stores, and took place in
the Fall of 2007 and the Spring of 2008. We dont expect any carry-over e¤ects from the previous
experiments, as there is a time-lag of more than a year between both experiments.
4The objective of the companys management was to increase prots by stimulating sales per-
formance. However, sales are highly volatile on a week to week basis, which makes it more di¢ cult
to determine targets.
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months average. The rewards for surpassing the respective targets were set to 75
euro and 200 euro for each store employee, including the store manager.5
We used a stratied randomization procedure to assign stores with a similar
number of employees to either treatment or untreated control. We assigned 60
stores to the treatment condition, and the remaining 68 stores served as the control
group.6 Ideally we would stratify with respect to the anti-shirking responses of
the rst questionnaire. However, this was infeasible, as we desired to measure the
anti-shirking behavior as close to the start of the experiment as possible. In fact,
the announcement of the experiment took place just before the deadline for the rst
questionnaire. Instead, we stratied with respect to store size, as size may be related
to the intensity of anti-shirking behavior.
The experiment was announced to store managers in a letter signed by the man-
agement of the company. Treatment stores received a letter explaining the rules
of the short-run team incentive. Stores in the control group only took notice that
there was a sales plan in other stores. The letters were sent through the retail chains
regular communication channels to make sure that neither store managers nor store
employees could infer that they were taking part in an experiment. Hence, this
experiment can be classied as a natural eld experiment (Harrison and List 2004).
The letter to treated stores also contained a poster. The store manager was
instructed to put up this poster in the employee canteen and to replace it with a
new copy each week. The posters contained feedback on the average number of items
sold per purchase in their store so far and the targets that they had to reach. We
used a simple graphical presentation to show how close stores were to reaching their
targets, see Figure 4.1 for an example.
All employees within the retail chain were asked to participate in a survey, both
prior to the experiment and afterwards. The survey was communicated as an inquiry
in employee satisfaction, without mentioning the experiment. For the rst survey,
5These bonusses would be equivalent to roughly 105 and 280 dollars at the time, and were
roughly 5 and 13 percent of an employees monthly wage. Part-timers would receive half of the
reward for both targets.
6Stores could be in one of the following ve categories: 7 employees or less, 8 and 9, 10 and
11, 12 until 14, or 15 and more employees. This procedure gave 14 (7), 30 (14), 45 (21), 29 (13),
and 10 (5) stores in each of the categories respectively, with the number of stores in the treatment
between brackets.
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Figure 4.1: Example of the feedback poster
prior to the experiment, we sent letters to the private address of store employees ask-
ing them to ll out an online survey, which they could enter using a store-identied
code. For the second survey, hard-copy questionnaires were sent to the stores. Em-
ployees were given the time to complete the questionnaires during their o¢ ce hours,
hoping that this would boost the response.7
4.3 Data description
The company provided us with weekly store-level sales data, covering a 64 week
period starting from the rst week of 2009. It contains indexed turnover gures and
the number of items sold per purchase. The experiment took place from week 43
until week 48 in 2009. Additionally, we received a personnel le before and after the
7Store managers would receive envelopes containing surveys and pens, and were asked to dis-
tribute these among employees. Employees would return their lled out surveys to their store
manager in a sealed blank envelope. Managers were instructed to send them back in a marked
envelope once a su¢ cient number of questionnaires had been lled out.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
experiment. The personnel les list for each store the number of employees, their
gender, age, tenure, and some information on the type of contract.
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of sales and the personnel le we
received prior to the experiment. In the 42 weeks preceding the experiment an
average store sells 1.8 items per purchase and average turnover is close to the base
week (week 43 of 2008). Further, a store has 9.6 employees on average, excluding the
store manager. Store employees are predominantly female (86%), range in age from
14 to 64, with an average age and tenure of 27 and 5 years, skewed towards younger
employees with a median age and tenure of 22 and 2 years respectively. The store
manager is slightly more often male (58%) than female, has on average a tenure of
12 years, and is on average 40 years old. The second personnel le is nearly identical
and therefore not displayed. Table 4.1 also provides a randomization check: In line
with our stratied randomization procedure, the number of employees does not di¤er
between treatment and control, neither do any other observable characteristics.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the average weekly sales performance of the number
of items sold per purchase and the turnover gures respectively, di¤erentiated by
treatment and control. The number of goods sold per purchase has a lower volatility
on a week to week basis compared to the turnover gures, which was why we chose
this measure to determine targets during the experiment. Figure 4.2 shows that
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treated stores sell slightly more items per customer over most of the sample period,
despite the random assignment of stores. This underlines the importance of including
store xed e¤ects in our estimations of the treatment e¤ects.
Figure 4.2: Average numer of goods sold per purchase
Figure 4.3: Average turnover gures
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Apart from sales performance, we also make use of softvariables that are con-
structed from the data gathered with questionnaires. The rst survey, where em-
ployees were approached at their private addresses, had a response rate of 31%. For
the second survey we gave employees the opportunity to ll out the questionnaire
at work, which led to a response rate of nearly 43%. However, the rst survey
method yielded a response from 117 stores, whereas in the second survey only 77
stores returned the questionnaires. The response rates and some characteristics of
the respondents can be found in Table 4.2 together with the descriptive statistics
of both questionnaires. It is possible that the di¤erent methods attracted a di¤er-
ent sample of employees, e.g., respondents in the rst survey are likely to be more
committed to the company, as they completed the survey in their own time. This
may give rise to a bias in our results, but only when sample selection is correlated
with the treatment. We found that the hours of work di¤ers signicantly between
the two questionnaires, where repondents in the second questionnaire work more
hours. However, this di¤erence is not correlated with the treatment. Table 4.2 also
shows that respondents in the rst questionnaire were signicantly younger in the
treatment than in control stores. This di¤erence is not present in the second ques-
tionnaire. We include individual controls in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis of
the questionnaire data to prevent that age di¤erences in response bias the estimate
of the treatment e¤ect.
The questionnaires included statements on job satisfaction, co-worker relations,
the relationship with the store manager, and anti-shirking behavior. Employees
could indicate to what extent they agreed to statements on a 7-point Likert scale,
ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". The wording of the statements
and their combination into variables of interest can be found in the Appendix. Table
4.2 shows for all variables their mean, standard deviation, and t-test for the equality
of means between treatment and control within a survey. There are some noteworthy
di¤erences in the questionnaire prior to the experiment: Stores in the treatment
happen to be signicantly more positive about their co-worker relations, more likely
to talk to a shirking colleague, and more positive about the consequences of anti-
shirking behavior. These di¤erences disappeared in the second questionnaire.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of both questionnaires
72 A Field Experiment on Team Incentives and Peer Pressure
A prerequisite to act against shirking colleagues is the ability to observe their
behavior. In the rst questionnaire we asked employees to indicate their agreement
to the statement: "It is easy to see whether co-workers are working well or poorly".
Figure 4.4 shows a histogram of their responses. Most employees state that they
either agree or strongly agree (63% combined) with this statement.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of the responses to "It is easy to see whether co-workers are
working well or poorly".
Given that most employees are able to observe whether a colleague is working
hard or not, they can act against a shirking colleague. We looked into employees
willingness to undertake four possible actions upon observing a colleague that slacks
o¤. We asked how likely they would be to "do nothing", "talk to the colleague in
private", "speak with the store manager", and "talk about it with other colleagues".
The anti-shirking index is formed by adding the scores of the four statements, where
the score from "do nothing" is reversed.8 Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show a histrogram
of the anti-shirking index for the rst and the second questionnaire, di¤erentiated
by control and treatment. Figure 4.5 illustrates that the distribution of the anti-
shirking index is relatively more concentrated towards the higher end for treated
employees, whereas Figure 4.6 shows no such di¤erence for the questionnaire after
the experiment.
8We nd a low Cronbach alpha coe¢ cient, which suggest that this index is a construct of
di¤erent variables. However, we chose to conform to the anti-shirking index in Freeman et al.
(2010), such that we can compare our ndings to theirs.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of the anti-shirking index in the rst questionnaire
Figure 4.6: Distribution of the anti-shirking index in the second questionnaire
4.4 Method
We use OLS panel estimation including week and store xed e¤ects to estimate
the treatment e¤ect. We estimate the treatment e¤ect on the number of items
sold per purchase, as the bonus made this performance measure most salient during
experiment. The regression equation reads:
yst = s + t + Tst + "st (4.1)
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Let yst be the logarithm of the items sold per purchase, and Tst be a dummy variable
which is equal to one during the experimental period t when store s is assigned to
the bonus treatment. Store xed e¤ects are indicated by s, week xed e¤ects by
t, and "st is an error term.9 The treatment e¤ect is given by . Next, we allow the
treatment e¤ect to be heterogeneous in the extent to which stores may su¤er from
free-riding. This gives the following regression:
yst = s + t + Tst + TstXs + PtXs + "st (4.2)
where Xs can be the anti-shirking index, co-worker relations, and the number of
employees of store s, measured before the experiment. Let Pt be a dummy variable
that has a value of one during the experimental period. By interacting Pt with Xs
we make sure that period-specic e¤ects of X are not erroneously picked up by the
interaction with the treatment (). We also present the results when we take the
indexed turnover gures as the dependent variable. However, this robustness check
informs us perhaps more about the production function than about the treatment
e¤ect.
We estimate the treatment e¤ect on the variables from the questionnaires with a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach. A change in responses between the questionnaires
before and after treatment may have occured in both the treatment and the control
group. We identify the treatment e¤ect as the di¤erence between those changes, and
estimate this using the following equation:
qist = + Ts + St + TsSt + "ist (4.3)
Let qist be the response to a particular item by employee i from store s in ques-
tionnaire t, where q can be co-worker relations, employee-manager relations, job
satisfaction, or anti-shirking behavior. The items can take a value of 1 to 7 on a
Likert-scale indicating to what extent an employee agrees or disagrees with a state-
ment in the questionnaire, or in some cases q corresponds to the value of a summation
of responses to a number of statements. The combination of items into variables can
9The standard errors are robust to serial correlation, as specied by Arellano (1987).
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be found in the Appendix. Let Ts be a dummy variable for individuals in the treated
stores, and St be a dummy variable for responses in the second questionnaire. The
error term is indicated by "ist.10 The parameter  gives the di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimator, i.e., the treatment e¤ect on q. We report the results of the estimations
using OLS, as they are easier to interpret than ordered choice probit.11
In order to estimate whether items from our questionnaire have an e¤ect on
sales performance, we shift our attention to the turnover during 16 weeks after the
experiment. Outside of the experimental period we focus on turnover gures, as
they give a more complete picture of store performance than the number of items
sold per purchase. This is also reected in the store managerscompensation, which
depends partially on the realized turnover. First, we estimate:
yst = s + t + TsNt + "st (4.4)
where Nt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the 16 weeks after the
experiment, and Ts is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for stores that were
treated. In case we observe an e¤ect of the treatment after the experiment, we may
be able to attribute this e¤ect to a change in one of the items in the questionnaire.
Therefore, we include the changes in q to see whether this explains the lagged e¤ect
of being treated:
yst = s + t + TsNt + qsNt + "st
where qs can for example indicate the change in anti-shirking behavior between
the rst and second survey for store s. The e¤ect of anti-shirking behavior on per-
formance could su¤er from an endogeneity problem in a cross-sectional analysis, as
was argued in the introduction. We exploit our experimental treatment to avoid this
problem. We measured anti-shirking behavior both before and after the experiment,
where it may been a¤ected by the treatment. Under the assumption that e¤ect of
10The analysis of the questionnaire data can be described as a cluster-randomized experiment,
because we draw multiple observations from most stores. Therefore, we allow the standard errors
to be clustered on the stores level. Including store random e¤ects does not a¤ect the results
qualitatively.
11We perform ordered probit estimation as a robustness check. The results do not depend on
the estimation procedure, as ordered probit yields qualitatively similar results. The ordered probit
estimations are available upon request.
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anti-shirking on performance is identical before and after the experiment, we can
use qs to nd the e¤ect of anti-shirking behavior on performance. Namely, the
e¤ect of the initial level of anti-shirking behavior on performance, i.e., before the
experiment, will be picked up by the store xed e¤ects s. In case the treatment
induced exogenous variation in anti-shirking, the coe¢ cient  captures the e¤ect of
anti-shirking behavior on performance.
4.5 Results
We begin by estimating the treatment e¤ect on the number of items sold per pur-
chase. Column 1 of Table 4.3 gives the results of estimating (4.1).12 We nd an
insignicant average treatment e¤ect. In other words, the short-run team incentive
did not a¤ect the number of items sold per purchase on average. Next, we allow
the treatment e¤ects to be heterogeneous to the extent that stores may su¤er from
free-riding. Free-riding is hypothesized to be less severe for stores with a smaller
number of employees, a stronger anti-shirking culture, or better co-worker relations.
The results of estimation (4.2), where we include the interaction of the treatment
dummy with the variables mentioned, can be found in column 2.13 None of the
interaction terms are statistical signicant. Neither do we nd a treatment e¤ect on
turnover.
In Table 4.4 we turn to the di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis of the questionnaire
data. In our baseline regression, we regress the anti-shirking index on the treatment
dummy, second questionnaire dummy, and their interaction. The treatment e¤ect
on anti-shirking behavior is the di¤erence between the treatment and control in the
di¤erence between the questionnaire before the experiment and the questionnaire
afterwards. This di¤-in-di¤ coe¢ cient is given by the interaction of the treatment
dummy with the second questionnaire dummy. The results of (4.3) are presented
in column 1 of Table 4.4. The treatment had a signicant and negative e¤ect on
the willingness to undertake anti-shirking behavior. Our estimate is a drop of 1.25
12Throughout the thesis, p-values are based on two-sided tests.
13The number of employees, anti-shirking index, and co-worker relations reported in the esti-
mations in column 2 and 4 of Table 3 are mean centered.
4.5 Results 77
Table 4.3: The e¤ect of short-run team incentives on sales performance
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Table 4.4: The e¤ect of short-run team incentives on the anti-shirking index
points on the anti-shirking index, where the standard deviation of the anti-shirking
index across stores is about 2.2 points.
The reduction in the willingness to undertake anti-shirking for treated stores
is robust to the inclusion of a number of store and individual control variables. In
column 2 we add the number of employees, the stores average score of the employee-
manager relations, and the average score on the ability to observe colleagues (which
was present during the rst questionnaire), as store control variables. The di¤-in-di¤
estimate remains comparable in size and signicance. Store size is not signicantly
related to anti-shirking behavior, however the biggest store in our sample employs
20 people, while in Freeman et al. (2010) notable di¤erence in anti-shirking arise for
rms with more than a hundred employees. In line with Freeman et al. (2010) we
nd a positive relation between the employee-manager relations and anti-shirking
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behavior. Finally, in column 3 the respondents gender, age category, and hours
contracted are added as individual control variables, which does not alter the results
either. Male employees, older employees, and full-time employees report a higher
willingness to undertake anti-shirking behavior.
We perform the same estimation procedure to nd the treatment e¤ect on the
respondentsexperienced consequences of anti-shirking. The results are presented
in column 1 of Table 4.5. Respondents in treated stores are less pleased with the
consequences of their anti-shirking behavior after the experiment. The estimated
di¤erence is almost 1.0 point on the consequence variable and is signicant at the
10 percent level. In columns 2 to 5, we split up the experienced consequences
variable into the separate statements. The e¤ect stems mainly from an expressed
dissatisfaction on two statements: "The employee not working well resented it" and
"The employee not working well improved" with p-values of 0.11 and 0.07 for the
di¤-in-di¤ estimates.
In Section 4.1 we argued that anti-shirking behavior can range from pressuring
peers to strengthening social ties with colleagues. The extremes of anti-shirking
behavior have opposite predictions on how a team incentive a¤ects the quality of
co-worker relations. Hence, the e¤ect of the temporary team incentive on co-worker
relations allows us to distinguish between the types of anti-shirking behavior. Table
4.6 presents the results of this di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation in column 1, and
in columns 2 and 3 with added controls. Column 1 shows that co-worker relations
su¤ered from the temporary team incentive, as the di¤-in-di¤ estimate is negative
and signicant at the 5% level, and signicant at the 10% level when including all
controls. The drop in the quality of co-worker relations in treated stores suggests
that peer pressure was the more prevalent type of anti-shirking behavior during the
experiment.
In sum, employees in treated stores experienced a drop in the quality of co-worker
relations, were less satised with the consequences of their anti-shirking behavior
after the experiment, and became less willing to exert such anti-shirking behavior
in the future. The combination of these results leads us to the conjecture that a
dissatisfaction with increased peer pressure in response to the team bonus o¤ers the
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Table 4.5: The e¤ect of short-run team incentives on the stated experiences with
anti-shirking behavior
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most likely explanation for the di¤erences in the questionnaire responses.
An alternative explanation for our ndings is that employees in treated stores
expressed a general disappointment in the second questionnaire, as only 1 out of
the 60 stores managed to earn the team bonus. We perform another di¤erence-
in-di¤erence analysis for both job satisfaction and employee-manager relations to
examine such a general disappointment for treated stores. Columns 4 and 5 of
Table 4.6 show that the di¤-in-di¤ estimates for both the expressed job satisfaction
and the employee-manager relations are far from signicant. The signicance does
not change when we drop store or individual control variables. This suggests that a
general disappointment for treated stores cannot explain a decrease in the willingness
to undertake anti-shirking, experienced consequences of anti-shirking, or co-worker
relations. We cannot rule out a second alternative explanation: Employees may
have responded di¤erently to anti-shirking behavior in the presence of the short-run
team incentive. For example, colleagues may suspect that anti-shirking behavior
was motivated by greed in the presence of a team bonus. This alternative could also
explain the negative responses regarding the consequences of anti-shirking.
Finally, we investigate whether the variables measured our questionnaire have
an e¤ect on sales performance. Table 4.7 presents the result of estimating (4.4).
The e¤ect of being treated does not signicantly a¤ect the indexed turnover gures
for the 16 weeks after the experiment. This makes it di¢ cult to attribute an e¤ect
of being treated on sales after experiment to a change in the variables guaged by
questionnaires.14
14For the subsample of stores that completed both surveys, there is a negative e¤ect of being
treated on the sales performance after the experiment. This negative e¤ect is explained rather well
by the drop in the anti-shirking index for treated stores. The change in the anti-shirking index is
signicantly related to the sales performance after the experiment. However, as shown in Table
4.7, this result is not robust to the inclusion of all stores.
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Table 4.6: The e¤ect of short-run team incentives on co-worker relations, job satis-
faction, and employee-manager relations
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Table 4.7: The e¤ect of being treated on sales performance after the experiment
4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we described the results of the introduction of a short-run team
incentive in a subsample of stores in a single retail chain. The incentive did not
lead to additional sales during the experiment for the treated stores. However, the
treatment did a¤ect the employeeswillingness to undertake anti-shirking behav-
ior and co-worker relations. These variables were gauged by questionnaires, both
prior to and after the experiment. Di¤erence in di¤erence analyses revealed that
the temporary team incentive had a negative e¤ect on the expressed willingness to
undertake anti-shirking behavior. We argue that this decrease results from a dissat-
isfaction with increased attempts of peer pressure. We nd a signicant change in
how employees in treated stores experience the consequences of their anti-shirking
behavior; they expressed that their colleagues had more resentment towards anti-
shirking actions and that the colleague in question improved his behavior less often.
Moreover, co-worker relations declined in response to the temporary team incentive.
We refute an alternative explanation, that employees in treated stores display a gen-
eral disappointment in the second questionnaire, by showing that job satisfaction
and employee-manager relations are una¤ected.
A limitation of our study is that we cannot observe employee behavior during
the experiment. We have to rely on survey data before and after the experiment
84 A Field Experiment on Team Incentives and Peer Pressure
instead. However, some of the concerns about questionnaires, such as a self-serving
bias in responses, are of less importance for this study, as we focus on di¤erence-in-
di¤erences. Our results would only be invalid in case a bias is correlated with the
treatment. Still, not observing the actual behavior is a serious limitation, as we can
only speculate about the mechanism behind our ndings. We cannot distinguish
our interpretation from some alternatives: For example, anti-shirking behavior may
have become less appreciated in the presence of the temporary team incentive, as
colleagues may suspect that the actions were motivated by greed.
In the introduction we discussed some studies that showed a positive inuence
of peer pressure on the sales performance. This implies that organisations should
strive to form and nurture a strong anti-shirking culture in order to achieve high
levels of performance. Management attention may o¤er an instrument to do so, as
employee-manager relationships are positively related to the willingness to undertake
anti-shirking behavior, also found by Freeman et al. (2010). Further, in contrast to
Freeman et al. (2010), we found that organisations should be cautious with intro-
ducing team incentives, as they can harm the anti-shirking culture. Team incentives
may either have a negative impact on how colleagues interpret anti-shirking behav-
ior, rendering these actions less e¤ective, or the negative e¤ect is only present when
increased attempts to reduce shirking are ine¤ective. We cannot pin down the mech-
anism that caused a drop in the willingness to undertake anti-shirking behavior, as
we do not observe actual behavior during the experiment. Further research on this
topic is needed.
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4.A Appendix
Variable construction
Anti-shirking index: The anti-shirking index is constructed from following four
statements: "If you were to see a feelow employee not working as hard as he or
she should, how likely would you be to: 1. Do nothing, 2. Talk directly to the
employee, 3. Talk to the store manager, 4. Talk about it with other colleagues."
(1-7 scale, 1 = very unlikely and 7 = very likely for each option in this statement).
The anti-shirking index adds the scores, where the score on "Do nothing" is reversed.
Consequences anti-shirking: "What was the outcome when you undertook some
action against a colleague that didnt work as hard as he or she should? 1. The
colleague resented it, 2. Other colleagues appreciated it, 3. The store manager
appreciated it, 4. The colleague not working well improved." (1-7 scale, 1 = strongly
disagree and 7 = strongly agree for each option in this statement). Consequences
anti-shirking adds the scores, where the score on "The colleague resented it" is
reversed.
Co-worker relations: Addition of the score on the following three statement: "I
am attached to my colleagues", "I am appreciated by my colleagues", and "I nd
the workatmosphere with colleagues enjoyable" (1-7 scale, 1 = strongly disagree and
7 = strongly agree).
Employee-manager relations: "My store manager is inspiring and motivating"
(1-7 scale, 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree).
Job satisfaction: The job satisfaction variable is created by adding the scores from
the following statements "My job is pleasant", "I am satised with my job", "I am
actively searching for another job" (1-7 scale, 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly
agree), where the score on the last statement is reversed.
Observability e¤ort: "It is easy to see whether colleagues are working hard or
not." (1-7 scale, 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree).

Chapter 5
Tournament Incentives in the
Field: Gender Di¤erences in the
Workplace
Joint with Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur, and Willem Verbeke.
5.1 Introduction
Throughout the world, in business as well as in government, men are strongly over-
represented in top positions. For instance, in 2008, only 16% of all ministerial
positions worldwide were held by women; similarly, among the worlds 192 heads
of government, there were only eight women (IPU 2008). In business, the situation
is not much di¤erent. For example, in a large sample of publicly traded US rms,
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) nd that only 2.5% of the ve highest-paid positions
are held by women. Wirth (2001) reports similar patterns for other countries.
Traditional explanations for the small number of women in top positions are occu-
pational sorting resulting from gender di¤erences in ability or preferences (Polachek
1981) and gender discrimination (e.g. Snizek and Neil 1992). Inspired by evolu-
tionary biology, recent experimental studies starting with Gneezy et al. (2003) 
suggest a third explanation: men are more strongly motivated by competitive in-
centives or more e¤ective in competitive environments than women, thus impeding
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women in competitions for promotions or for new jobs.
By now, there is quite some empirical support for such gender di¤erences. In
a lab experiment, Gneezy et al. (2003) let participants solve computerized mazes
and varied the competitiveness of the environment. They nd that, while men and
women perform equally well under individual piece rates, men perform much better
than women under competitive incentives. Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) show that
these gender di¤erences are already present at a very young age. In a 40 meter dash,
nine-year-old boys run much faster in a race than when they run alone. By contrast,
while girls run as fast as boys when running alone, competition does not increase
their running speed. In non-experimental settings, underperformance of women
under competitive pressure is found in student admissions to schools (Jurajda and
Münich 2008 and Örs et al. 2008) and in Grand Slam tennis (Paserman 2007). The
recent eld study by Lavy (2008), however, nds no gender di¤erences in the e¤ect
of relative performance pay on high-school teachers performance in Israel. Croson
and Gneezy (2009) provide a recent overview of the literature.1
This chapterstudies gender di¤erences in competition by conducting a eld exper-
iment in a naturally occurring work environment. A unique feature of our analysis is
that we study competition among teams of employees, each headed by a professional
manager. Using the variation in the gender composition of the teams as well as in
the gender of the manager, we test whether female-dominated and female-led teams
respond di¤erently to competitive incentives, which were introduced in a random
sample of the geographically dispersed teams. Moreover, we test for possible inter-
action e¤ects between the gender of the manager and the gender composition of the
team. Studying gender di¤erences in competition among manager-led teams is most
relevant in the context of the sharp gender di¤erences in holding executive-level
positions discussed above. Reaching an executive-level position, be it in business
or government, commonly requires winning several promotion or job competitions.
1A closely related strand in the experimental literature studies self-selection into competitive
environments. Datta Gupta et al. (2011), Dohmen and Falk (2011), Flory et al. (2010), and
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) nd that men opt signicantly more often for competitive com-
pensation schemes than women. Gneezy et al. (2009) show that the reverse holds in a matrilineal
society. Recent studies have shown that the gender gap in self-selection into competition by and
large vanishes for girls attending single-sex schools (Booth and Nolen 2009) and when the tourna-
ment is among teams rather than among individuals (Dargnies 2009).
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These competitions are often decided by candidatesrelative performance which (ex-
cept for employees at the lowest hierarchical level) depends not merely on ones own
e¤ort or talent, but also crucially on the performance of the members of the team
one leads.
More concretely, we ran a eld experiment in a discount retail chain in The
Netherlands specializing in shoes, sports apparel, and casual clothing. About half
of the 128 stores are led by a female manager, while across stores the percentage
of female employees ranges from 50% to 100%. In a randomly selected subset of
stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among stores. The selected
stores were divided into pools of 5 and competed for a period of 6 weeks on the
basis of percentage sales growth compared to the same period the year before. All
employees of the store with the highest sales growth over 6 weeks received a bonus of
75 euro; employees of each pools runner-up received 35 euro. The stores that took
part in a competition received weekly feedback in the form of a poster that ranked
each store in their pool on their cumulative sales growth gures.
We nd that, on average, the tournaments increase percentage sales growth by
about ve percentage points. We nd no signicant di¤erence in the e¤ect of tour-
naments on sales growth between stores with a male manager and stores with a
female manager, nor do we nd that sales competitions have a larger e¤ect on per-
formance in stores with a higher fraction of male employees. However, this masks a
remarkable interaction e¤ect of these two gender variables on sales growth respon-
siveness: in stores with a male manager, the e¤ect of competition increases in the
share of male employees, while the reverse holds for female-led stores. These e¤ects
are substantial.2
We can think of three plausible mechanisms behind this result. First, the re-
sponse of team members to competition may crucially depend on the way a com-
petition is communicated and promoted by the teams manager. Both male and
2Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), and Ivanova-Stenzel and Kuebler (2005)
also study whether opponents gender matters for performance under competition. We do not look
into this issue, as teams have limited information, if any, on the gender composition of the stores
they compete with. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) analyze sales competitions among retail-
ers organized by a commodities manufacturer. They do not study gender di¤erences, but instead
focus on the e¤ect of the number of contestants in the tournament and on dynamic incentives.
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female managers may have succeeded in making the competition appeal to employ-
ees of their own sex, but less so to employees of the opposite sex. Alternatively,
the team nature of the incentive scheme may drive the di¤erence in response. A
male (female) manager may be better in strengthening the teams internal cohesion
or curtailing free-rider problems if many team members are male (female). Lastly,
as managers and employees were not randomised over stores, teamsgender com-
position may be the result of endogeneous matching on unobservables, which may
correlate with teams responsiveness to competitive incentives. We elaborate on
these interpretations after presenting the results in Section 5.4.
A number of recent studies argue that competition can motivate people not
merely because of the chance of winning a monetary reward, but also because of non-
pecuniary benets such as perceived esteem, status, and social recognition (Auriol
and Renault 2008, Besley and Ghatak 2008, Frey and Neckermann 2008, Moldovanu
et al. 2007). Kosfeld and Neckermann (2010) show experimentally that a tour-
nament with no more at stake than an award of zero material value can have a
great impact on peoples performance. Likewise, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2009)
and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) nd that simply providing information to subjects
about their relative performance boosts performance substantially. Bandiera et al.
(2009), however, nd the opposite e¤ect. In our experiment, parallel to the treat-
ment described above, another subset of stores competed in tournaments with the
same setup except for the absence of a monetary reward for winning. So, stores also
competed in pools of ve, for a period of six weeks, and received a weekly ranking of
stores in their pool based on sales growth, but neither the manager nor the employ-
ees could earn a bonus. We nd that tournaments without monetary rewards have
a signicantly positive e¤ect on sales growth. The e¤ect is of similar magnitude as
the e¤ect of tournaments with monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value
of winning a tournament. Gender di¤erences in the e¤ects of competition are also
similar in both treatments.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we describe the experimental set-up
and the data. Section 5.3 describes the methodology of our empirical analysis and
Section 5.4 reports the results. Section 5.5 concludes.
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5.2 Experimental set-up and data description
The eld experiment took place in 2007-2008 in a discount retail chain in The Nether-
lands, selling male and female clothing, shoes, and sports apparel. The chain consists
of 128 geographically dispersed stores operating under one brand name and employ-
ing a total of 1574 people. Store employees earn a at hourly wage slightly above
the legal minimum hourly wage. Store managers earn about 45% more and part of
their pay is performance-related. On average, slightly less than 5% of a managers
earnings is performance-related.
The companys management wished to intensify the use of incentives. In con-
sultation with the management, we designed sales competitions among subsets of
stores. We used storespercentage growth in sales as compared to sales in the same
period a year earlier as the performance measure. Percentage sales growth is a com-
monly used performance measure in this company and is one of the key determinants
of store managersperformance pay. We decided to introduce relative performance
incentives rather than incentives based on absolute targets, as sales are very volatile
(see Figure 5.1). A large part of this volatility is caused by common shocks (weather,
holidays, advertising campaigns on national television, etc.),3 which renders relative
performance pay attractive (Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and Stokey 1983, and
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983).
In the sales competitions, stores competed in pools of ve during a period of six
weeks. Stores received weekly feedback in the form of a poster containing cumulative
sales growth gures for all ve stores in their pool, ranked in descending order.
Store managers were instructed to put up these posters in the stores canteen, where
employees drink co¤ee and have lunch. The posters as well as the instructions were
sent to the store managers through the companys usual channels; store managers
and store employees did not know they took part in an experiment. Hence, our
experiment can be classied as a natural eld experiment (Harrison and List 2004).
Store employees were not informed about the sales competitions by the companys
3A panel regression including only week xed e¤ects explains about 65% of the variation in
storessales growth. The spike in week 71 in Figure 5.1 is a common shock, most likely resulting
from weather conditions; details are available on request.
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Figure 5.1: Weekly percentage sales growth compared to the same week the year
before
management; it was up to the store managers to promote the competition.
Our study comprises two experimental treatments and an untreated control.
First, in the bonustreatment, stores compete for a monetary reward. The store
manager and all employees of the winning store received a reward of 75 euro; the
manager and employees of the runner-up received 35 euro.4 Second, in the feedback
treatment, no monetary reward could be won. Apart from the presence or absence of
a monetary reward, the bonus treatment and the feedback treatment were identical.
Our dataset covers a period of 84 weeks (starting in week 1 of 2007). Sales
competitions took place in two experimental periods of 6 weeks (in weeks 44 - 49
and weeks 71 - 76). Figure 5.2 gives an overview of all the events related to the
experiment. In the rst experimental round, all stores were assigned to one of the
two experimental treatments, either bonus or feedback. In the second round, we
4The rst prize was about 5 percent of an employees monthly wage. Rewards were halved for
part-time employees.
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the experimental set-up and timing of events
included a control group of stores not taking part in a competition. We decided
against a control group in the rst round, because at that time we intended to focus
our study on the e¤ects of monetary rewards in tournaments. The second round
gives us the opportunity to also assess the e¤ects of tournaments per se.
Competition provides stronger incentives when contestants are more homoge-
neous (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Bearing this in mind, we used data on past sales
performance to create relatively homogeneous pools of stores. The assignment pro-
cedure for the rst round of the experiment was as follows. All stores were ranked
according to percentage sales growth over the weeks 1 up to 37 compared to the same
period the year before. The ve stores with the highest sales growth were grouped
into one pool and assigned to the bonus treatment; the next ve were grouped into
the next pool and assigned to the feedback treatment. This process was iterated
consecutively until all 125 stores were grouped into 13 bonus treatment pools and
12 feedback treatment pools.5
The assignment procedure for the second experimental round was partly imposed
by the company. For fairness reasons, the company obliged us to assign all stores
who were in the feedback treatment during the rst period to the bonus treatment
in the second period.6 We grouped these stores into new pools of ve stores each,
this time using sales performance in weeks 50 to 68 to create relatively homogeneous
pools. The remaining stores were assigned either to the feedback condition or to the
5During the rst round of the experiment, 3 stores were closed for renovation.
6The company wished, at a later point in time, to evaluate the experiment together with the
store managers and feared that it would be considered unfair when some stores had never been
assigned to the bonus condition.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
untreated control group according to a similar procedure as before: the ve best-
performing stores in weeks 50 to 68 were assigned to the control condition, the next
ve stores were grouped into a pool and became part of the feedback condition, and
so on. To avoid confusion and diminish sabotage opportunities, we replaced a store
when two stores from the same city happened to be assigned to the same pool. In
both periods, we made two of these adjustments.
The company provided us with the weekly sales data of each store, presented in
indexes for condentiality reasons. We used these to calculate the percentage growth
in sales as compared to sales in the same week a year earlier. We henceforth refer
to this measure as weekly sales growth. We also received each stores personnel le
before both experimental rounds, with information on gender, age, and tenure of
the stores manager and employees. Descriptive statics are given in Table 5.1.Across
all stores, average weekly sales growth was negative in the period we consider. The
retail chain had slightly less female-led stores than male-led stores.7 The average
7In both personnel les, for some stores information about the manager is missing, either
because the store temporarily had no manager, or (in a single case) a store had two managers.
In one store, a male manager was replaced by a female manager in between the two experimental
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store had 12 employees (excluding the store manager), of which 85% was female. The
average age and tenure of store managers was 39 years and 12 years, respectively.
Some of the stores underwent a renovation, which made their appearance more
modern without changing the range of products sold. Before the rst experiment,
six stores had been renovated; at the start of the second experimental period, an
additional 9 stores had been renovated. As stores are closed during renovation, there
are 268 missing store-week observations. In the analysis we control for the e¤ects of
renovation on subsequent sales growth by including a dummy variable which takes
value 1 from the week in which a renovated store is reopened onwards.
Table 5.1 also reports the descriptive statistics within the two treatment groups
and the control group to which stores were assigned in the second experimental
period (see Figure 5.2). The three groups of stores hardly di¤er on observables. A
randomization check using F-tests reveals that there are no statistically signicant
di¤erences in the means of the observables between the three groups. Table 5.2
reports the descriptive statistics separated by store managers gender, where we
only include the 114 stores we use in analyzing the gender e¤ects (see footnote
7). Over the whole period, male-managed stores reached 0.4 percentage points
higher weekly sales growth than female-managed stores, but the di¤erence is not
statistically signicant. Male managers have signicantly longer tenure than female
managers, and run stores with signicantly more employees. In the analysis below,
we perform robustness checks where we control for these di¤erences. Importantly,
there is quite a lot of variation in the percentage of female employees, both for male-
and female-led stores. Figure 5.3 depicts the distribution of the percentage of female
employees in stores, separated by managersgender. Gender of the manager is not
signicantly related to the gender composition of store employees. Note that there
are no stores with a majority of male employees. This implies that our estimates
of the e¤ect of stores gender composition are based on, and, hence, relevant for
female-dominated teams.
periods. When analysing gender e¤ects, we exclude these stores from the analysis. This leaves
114 stores. In ve other stores, the manager was replaced by a manager with the same gender;
excluding these stores from the analysis does not a¤ect the results qualitatively.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics by store managersgender
Figure 5.3: Distribution of the percentage of female employees by store managers
gender
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We estimate the e¤ects of the competitions on sales growth using OLS panel esti-
mation including week and store xed e¤ects. Let yst be the sales growth of store
s in week t. Further, let B1st be a dummy variable which is equal to one during the
rst experimental round when store s was assigned to the bonus treatment (rather
than to the feedback treatment). Similarly, let B2st and F
2
st be dummy variables
for whether in the second experimental round, store s was assigned to the bonus
treatment and to the feedback treatment respectively (rather than to the control
group). To assess the average e¤ect of the treatments in both experimental periods,
we estimate:
yst = s + t + B
1
st + B
2
st + F
2
st + Rst + "st (5.1)
where s and t are store xed e¤ects and week xed e¤ects, respectively, Rst is a
dummy for whether store s had been renovated before week t, and "st is an error
term. We cluster standard errors at the store level to correct for serial correlation
within stores as well as for heteroscedasticity across stores (see Bertrand et al. 2004
for a discussion of the importance of correcting for serial correlation in di¤erences-
in-di¤erences estimation).
Observe that we allow the e¤ect of the bonus treatment relative to the feedback
treatment to di¤er between the rst and second experimental round, i.e., we do not
restrict that  =  . Loosely speaking, for each experimental period, we estimate
di¤erences-in-di¤erences e¤ects of the treatments, where we assume that in all non-
experimental weeks, it is business-as-usualfor all stores. Hence, we do not allow for
carry-over e¤ects of treatments into the weeks following an experimental period. We
have checked the robustness of this approach in two ways. First, none of our results is
a¤ected qualitatively if we exclude the rst 8 weeks after either experimental period
(weeks 50 - 57 and/or weeks 77 - 84) from our analysis. Second, all our results from
the rst experimental period carry over to an estimation which includes only the
rst 49 weeks (i.e., which excludes all weeks after the rst period; see Figure 5.2).
Similarly, we nd qualitatively similar results for the treatment e¤ects in the second
experimental period if we include only the period after the rst experimental period
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(week 50 onwards).8
Besides the average treatment e¤ects, we investigate how these treatment e¤ects
depend on the gender of the store manager, the gender composition of the stores
employees, the interaction between these two, and the stores team size. To study
these issues, we add interaction e¤ects to equation (5.1). Let E1t be a dummy that
takes value one for all observations in the rst experimental period (weeks 44 - 49)
and, similarly, let E2t be a dummy that takes value one in the second experimental
period (weeks 71 - 76). The e¤ect of variable Xps on the e¤ect of our treatments is
estimated by:
yst = s+t+B
1
st+X
1
sB
1
st+X
1
sE
1
t+B
2
st+F
2
st+X
2
sB
2
st+X
2
sF
2
st+ X
2
sE
2
t+Rst+"st
(5.2)
where Xps is the value of the variable X for store s in experimental period p 2
f1; 2g as taken from the personnel les received just before period p.9 Again, we
allow for di¤erences between the estimated e¤ect of variable Xps on the e¤ect of the
bonus treatment relative to the feedback treatment between the rst and second
experimental period ( versus    ). The inclusion of the E1t and E2t terms is
necessary to obtain di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates of the e¤ect of Xps on the
treatment e¤ects. Not including these terms would imply that period-specic e¤ects
of Xps on stores sales growth would be erroneously picked up by the interaction
e¤ects with the treatments (i.e., by , , and ).
8We cannot, however, identify any possible carry-over e¤ects of rst-period assignment to
second-period treatment e¤ects, as assignment in the second period was not completely random
(see Section 5.2). Note, however, the long time lag between the rst and the second round (20
weeks).
9Obviously, in most of our regressions Xps is a vector of variables and, likewise, , , , , and
 are vectors of coe¢ cients. There is not enough variation in Xs across periods to include these
variables as separate regressors. However, the e¤ects of these lower-level terms of the interaction
are captured by the store xed e¤ects. As a robustness check, we also estimated a random e¤ects
regression model, where we took up Xs as separate regressors. We nd qualitatively similar results
to those reported in the next section. Details are available upon request.
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The rst column in Table 5.3 gives the results of estimating (5.1). Focusing on the
second round, we nd that the bonus treatment and the feedback treatment both
have positive average treatment e¤ects on weekly sales growth. This average treat-
ment e¤ect is statistically signicant for the feedback treatment, and is borderline
signicant for the bonus treatment with a p-value of 0.13.10 The size of the e¤ects is
also economically signicant, as stores in the bonus and feedback treatment achieve
4.8 and 6.9 percentage points additional sales growth, respectively.11 The di¤erence
in the e¤ects of the bonus treatment and feedback treatment in the second period is
not signicant: a Wald test on the restriction that the e¤ects are equal ( = ) has
a p-value of 0.32. In the rst round of the experiment, stores in the bonus treatment
perform slightly better than stores in the feedback treatment, however this di¤erence
is again insignicant.12 Hence, the nancial reward in the bonus treatment did not
trigger additional sales growth on top of the e¤ect of the tournament that is also
present in the feedback treatment.
Next, we allow the treatment e¤ects to vary by the gender of the store manager
and by the gender composition of storesemployees. Since we did not nd any dif-
ference between the two treatments, we pool the observations of both competitions;
i.e., we investigate gender di¤erences in the response to competition irrespective of
whether a monetary prize could be won.13 Pooling the observations gives a slightly
di¤erent specication:
yst = s + t + (B
2
st + F
2
st) + X
2
s (B
2
st + F
2
st) +  X
2
sE
2
t + Rst + "st: (5.3)
When we estimate (5.3) with X2s only including a female manager dummy, we nd
10Throughout the thesis, p-values are based on two-sided tests.
11Lack of data on the absolute value of sales and prot margins implies that we cannot establish
whether this increase in sales outweighs the cost of the tournaments. However, the companys
management was content with these results.
12Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that  =   in (5.1), i.e., that the di¤erences
between the e¤ects of the bonus and the feedback treatments are equal in the rst and second
round (p-value is 0.18).
13The results are by and large the same when we do not pool the treatments, as can be seen
by comparing the rst column of Table 5.4 with the second column of Table 5.3, which reports the
results of estimating equation (5.2).
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Table 5.3: The e¤ect of competition on sales growth
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only insignicant interaction e¤ects (not reported for brevity). Hence, on average,
the e¤ect of competition on sales growth does not di¤er between stores with a male
manager and those with a female manager. Similarly, we nd insignicant interac-
tion e¤ects if X2s only includes the percentage of female employees in a store. Thus,
across all stores, we nd no evidence that the gender composition of store employ-
ees inuences the e¤ects of competition. However, interacting the store managers
gender and the gender composition of store employees reveals an interesting pat-
tern. The rst column of Table 5.4 gives the results of estimating (5.3), where the
treatments are interacted with both a female manager dummy and the percentage of
female employees, as well as interacted with the interaction between the female man-
ager dummy and the percentage of female employees. Thus, we allow for di¤erent
e¤ects of the gender composition of the storespersonnel on the e¤ect of competition
in stores with a male manager compared to stores with a female manager.14
Remarkably, we nd that the sign of the e¤ect of the percentage of female em-
ployees on a stores responsiveness to competition depends on the gender of the store
manager. In stores with a male manager, the e¤ect of competition on sales growth
signicantly decreases in the share of female employees with a marginal e¤ect of
 0:404 percentage point sales growth. An increase of one standard deviation in the
percentage of women employed in a store, or about 12.5 percent points, leads to a
decrease of about 5 percentage points in the treatment e¤ect for male-led stores.
By contrast, in female-led stores the responsiveness to competition increases in the
percentage of female employees, with a marginal e¤ect of  0:404 + 0:886 = 0:482
percentage point sales growth. A Wald test shows that this e¤ect di¤ers signicantly
from zero (p-value is 0.03). The magnitude of this e¤ect is the same as in male-led
stores: an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of female employees
increases the e¤ect of competition by 6 percentage points.
The estimated treatment e¤ects for various manager/employee combinations are
depicted in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Figure 5.4 gives the point estimates and the 95% con-
dence intervals of the e¤ect of competition in the second round for male-managed
14In the estimation reported in Table 5.4, the percentage of female employees is mean-centered.
Table 5.4 only reports the coe¢ cients from the second round of the experiment, as we did not
include a control group in the rst round of the experiment, see Section 5.2.
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Table 5.4: The e¤ect of competition on sales growth: gender di¤erences
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Figure 5.4: Gender di¤erences in the e¤ect of competition on sales growth depicted
with a 95 percent condence interval of the estimates
and female-managed stores separately. Figure 5.5 depicts the same but with 90%
condence intervals. Both gures clearly show that the competition has been most
e¤ective in raising sales growth in male-led stores with a relatively high percentage
of male employees. Figure 5.5 shows that the e¤ect of competition is statistically sig-
nicant in male-managed stores as long as the percentage of women employed does
not exceed 80%. In female-managed stores, the pattern is reversed: the estimated
impact of competition strongly increases with the percentage of female employees.
The e¤ect of competition in these stores is signicant when at least 90% of the
employees is female.
We have checked the robustness of our ndings by controlling for several other
variables. First, the results reported in Table 5.4 are not a¤ected if we control for
managerstenure or for managersage. Similarly, neither employeesaverage age nor
average tenure in a store a¤ects our results. Lastly, none of our results is a¤ected
qualitatively when weighing employees by their full-time equivalent.
Overall, our ndings give a nuanced picture of gender di¤erences in manager-led
team performance under competition. It is not gender per se that a¤ects perfor-
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Figure 5.5: Gender di¤erences in the e¤ect of competition on sales growth depicted
with a 90 percent condence interval of the estimates
mance under competition, but rather the match between the teams manager and
the gender composition of the team: competition positively a¤ects performance
when the manager and a su¢ ciently high percentage of employees have the same
gender. As mentioned in the Introduction, we can think of three plausible mecha-
nisms behind this result. First, the response of team members to competition may
crucially depend on the way a competition is communicated and promoted by the
teams manager. In our experiments, we deliberately left a lot of discretion to team
managers on how to use the competition as an incentive device. In particular, both
the announcement of the competitions and the weekly posters were only sent to the
store managers, not to the employees. It was up to the team managers to make the
competitions appealing to their employees. Managers may have succeeded in making
the competitions appealing to team members of their own sex, but less so to team
members of the opposite sex.15 This interpretation is well in line with evidence from
15The idea that dissimilarity in personal attributes such as gender can deteriorate communica-
tion in organizations dates back to at least March and Simon (1958), who argue that dissimilarity
may give rise to language incompatibilityand less frequent communication. There is pervasive ev-
idence for homophily: the tendency that people interact more frequently with people with similar
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management studies showing that when working for a manager of the opposite sex,
employees nd their duties and responsibilities much more ambiguous than when
working for a manager of the same sex (Tsui and OReilly 1989, McNeilly and Russ
2000). Relatedly, a number of studies in organizational psychology have shown that,
as compared to employees with opposite-sex managers, those with same-sex man-
agers are more likely to develop high-quality leader-member exchange relationships
(LMX) a widely used measure of manager-employee mutual support, trust, and
obligation which may in turn facilitate communication.16 Lastly, experimental
evidence using a subject pool of both students and banking executives nds that
female participants tend to feel more comfortable supervising a female person than
a male person in a challenging task, while male participants expect fewer conicts
with a male subordinate and perceive males to be more competent in a challenging
task (Mai-Dalton and Sullivan 1981).
Alternatively, as team composition was not randomized in our experiment, the
teamsgender composition may be the result of endogeneous matching on unobserv-
ables. If these unobservable characteristics are correlated with teamsresponsiveness
to competition, the pattern we nd may arise without there being a causal link be-
tween teamsgender composition and performance under competition. For instance,
suppose that relatively competitive managers have a preference for supervising em-
ployees of their own gender. These managers will self-select into (or gather) a team
with more employees of their own gender than less competitive managers, and they
will respond more strongly to tournament incentives. In this scenario, our results
are driven by unobserved managerial characteristics rather than by team compo-
sition. Our experimental design does not allow us to discriminate between these
mechanisms, so that this remains an important open question we hope to address
in future work.
A third possible mechanism behind our results might be that male managers
rather than dissimilar characteristics (McPherson et al. 2001, Borgatti and Foster 2003, Reagans
2005). While we nd strong e¤ects of gender similarity, we nd no e¤ect of similarity in age or
tenure on storesresponsiveness to competition. This suggests that it is indeed gender similarity
rather than similarity in general that drives our results.
16See e.g. Duchon et al. (1986), Pelled and Xin (2000), and Varma and Stroh (2001). Wayne
et al. (1994) discuss a number of reasons for why these di¤erences may arise.
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are better at reducing free-rider behavior in a team with many male employees,
and likewise for female managers with female-dominated teams. We address free-
rider behaviour by using the number of workers employed in the store, which varies
between 5 and 20 employees across stores. Note, though, that we do not have an
ideal set-up to analyze free-rider e¤ects, as store size is not randomized. When there
is an unobserved, systematic di¤erence between small and large stores that a¤ects
the responsiveness to competitive incentives, this is reected in the estimates, so that
these are to be interpreted with caution.17 The second column of Table 5.4 gives the
results of including the number of employees interacted with the competition dummy,
i.e., the pooled treatments. We nd no indication for free-riding behavior. The e¤ect
of competition does not depend on the number of employees.18 Also, the inclusion
of the number of employees hardly a¤ects the estimates of the gender e¤ects on
performance under competition. Finally, interacting the number of employees with
the gender composition of stores yields results that do not support the interpretation
that free-rider behavior is reduced in stores where the manager and a large part of
the stores employees are of the same gender; details are available upon request.
5.5 Concluding remarks
We have studied how teams led by a professional manager respond to competitive
incentives. Overall, we nd strong e¤ects, even when there is no monetary reward to
winning the competition. Further, our results suggest that the gender of the manager
and the gender composition of the team jointly a¤ect performance under competi-
tion. Male-led teams are more responsive to competition when a larger fraction of
the team members is male. By contrast, female-led teams respond more strongly
to competition when the fraction of female members is larger. If generalizable, our
results give rise to some optimism about future reductions in the stark gender in-
equalities in executive positions in business and government that we discussed in
17For instance, free-rider e¤ects are mitigated when managers with better team-building capa-
bilities are more likely to be assigned to larger stores.
18The same conclusion is drawn when the gender interaction terms are excluded from the esti-
mation (so that X2s in (3) only includes the number of employees).
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the Introduction. As women have massively entered the labor market over the last
decades, work teams have become more gender-diverse. Our results suggest that
this should put female managers on a more equal footing in contests for promotions.

Chapter 6
Summary and directions for
further research
In this thesis, I study how organizations can incentivize a group of individuals, both
in theory and by conducting eld experiments. The eld experiments introduce
short-term team incentives in a randomly selected sample of stores that belong to
a single Dutch retail chain of 128 stores. The results o¤er valuable lessons for both
researchers and practitioners alike. In addition, this thesis provides a theoretical in-
vestigation of the interaction between the remuneration schemes that organizations
o¤er to its employees and the interpersonal relations between colleagues. Hereby,
this thesis gives insights into an underexposed aspect of teamwork: The social re-
lationships between colleagues, which is a job aspect that is highly valued by most
people. This chapter provides a summary of the ndings, discusses some policy
implications, and makes suggestions for further research.
6.1 Summary
Chapter 2 identies a channel through which nancial incentives for productive
activities can a¤ect social interaction between colleagues. We develop a principal-
multi-agent model where agents do not only choose their productive activities, but
also their social interaction with colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker altruism.
We show that, in the absence of team or relative performance incentives, workers
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do not invest enough in their relationships with co-workers, as the benets from
relationship-building are not fully internalized. This externality problem comes at a
cost to the employer, as social interaction with colleagues is a valued job attribute:
Good co-worker relationships allow employers to attract and retain workers for lower
wages. Employers can stimulate social interaction among colleagues by providing
either team incentives or relative performance incentives. These incentives give work-
ers a strategic motivation to invest in the relationships with their co-workers, as the
externality problem in e¤ort provision is less severe with a more altruistic colleague.
Incentives for e¤ort are restored through ne-tuning of individual incentives.
The predictions can be distinguished from those developed in related literature.
We predict that, under the assumption of conditionally altruistic or reciprocal agents,
team incentives and relative performance incentives lead to more social interaction
and better co-worker relations. Instead, theories of peer pressure in teams or sabo-
tage in tournaments predict worse co-worker relations in response to those incentives
(Kandel and Lazear 1992, Lazear 1989). Theories of helping behavior need some
complementarity in productive e¤orts to come to the same prediction (FitzRoy and
Kraft 1986). Finally, a team bonus on top of at wages does not lead to better
co-worker relations in models that assume inequality-averse agents (Bartling 2011).
Next to the potential positive e¤ect of team and relative performance incentives for
co-worker relations, a second managerial implication is that social relations matter
for the e¤ects of incentives. If a manager is unaware of the social setting and does
not ne-tune individual incentives for e¤ort, then team bonuses may give too strong
incentives, while relative performance incentives may be too weak.
Chapter 3 also studies how interpersonal relationships between colleagues may
inuence the optimal use of incentives. I study a setting where co-workers have
the best information about each others e¤ort. Managers may try to retrieve and
exploit this information through peer evaluation. Chapter 3 studies peer evaluation
in a pure moral hazard model of production by two limitedly liable agents. Agents
receive signals about their colleagues e¤ort level, and are asked to report them to
the principal. An individual bonus for the receipt of a positive evaluation stimulates
e¤ort as long as signals are revealed truthfully, because agents desire to increase
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the likelihood that their colleague receives a positive signal and rates performance
accordingly. The agents evaluation decision is characterized by a trade-o¤ between
a cost of lying about the received signal and the internalized benet (or cost) from a
bonus to a friend (or foe). Lying costs ascertain that there can be truthful revelation
of signals, while interpersonal relations may cause a bias. Nevertheless, the princi-
pal always includes a bonus for receiving a positive peer evaluation in the optimal
contract. The principal will only use a team bonus in addition to the peer evalua-
tion bonus in case the latter becomes severely constrained by strong social relations
between colleagues or small lying costs.
The result that co-worker relations, either good or bad, constrain the peer eval-
uation bonus so as to keep evaluations truthful has a testable implication: Incentive
e¤ects of peer evaluation diminish with more pronounced social relations between co-
workers. This result also has an implication for management practice, as managers
should organize peer evaluations for employees that are rather indi¤erent towards
one another. The chapter contributes to an ongoing debate in the management
literature about whether peer evaluations can be used to determine merit pay and
promotions, or whether they should only be used for training or development (see
among others Edwards and Ewen 1996, Coates 1998). We showed that the concern
of a (dis)likability bias can be overcome by using a smaller bonus for peer evalua-
tion. Moreover, the chapter illustrated that even invalid peer evaluations can have
incentive e¤ects through the inuence over a colleagues expected costs of lying; e.g.,
employees dont want to put a befriended colleague in the di¢ cult position of having
to lie about their performance.
Chapter 4 describes the results from a eld experiment on the determinants and
e¤ects of anti-shirking behavior in a retail chain. Stores are randomly assigned to
a temporary team incentive treatment or a control group. The team incentive does
not increase sales performance during the experiment. The team bonus has a neg-
ative e¤ect on employees stated willingness to undertake anti-shirking behavior.
We present suggestive evidence for the claim that employees in treated stores un-
successfully attempted to raise group performance by exerting more peer pressure
during the experiment, at the expense of co-worker relations. Questionnaire results
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revealed that employees in treated stores stated more often that colleagues reacted
negatively in response to anti-shirking behavior, less often that colleagues improved
their behavior, and were less positive about the social relations with co-workers.
Related studies have shown that peer e¤ects can be productive (Mas and Moretti
2009 and Falk and Ichino 2006). Therefore, organizations should strive to create
and nurture a strong anti-shirking culture. In line with Freeman et al. (2010) we
identify a possible instrument to stimulate the willingness to undertake anti-shirking
behavior; namely, management attention, as employee-management relations have a
positive inuence on anti-shirking behavior. Further, our study extends the analysis
in Freeman et al. (2010) by taking advantage of our experimental set-up. The
chapter shows that, in contrast to Freeman et al. (2010), the team incentive has
a negative e¤ect on the anti-shirking culture. Whether the team incentives has
a negative impact on how colleagues interpret anti-shirking behavior or whether
the negative e¤ect is only present when increased attempts to reduce shirking are
ine¤ective remains unclear from our study.
Chapter 5 presents the results of a eld experiment that introduces short-term
sales competitions among random subsets of stores. We introduce two experimental
treatments, which were identical apart from the presence or absence of a monetary
reward for the winning store and runner-up. Remarkably, sales competitions with
and without monetary rewards have a similar positive e¤ect on sales growth, suggest-
ing a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Further, in contrast to recent
literature on gender di¤erences in competition (Gneezy et al. 2003, among others),
we nd that the positive e¤ect does not vary by the gender of the store manager
nor by the gender composition of storesemployees. However, this zero-result masks
an interesting interaction e¤ect of these two gender variables for the responsiveness
to competition: The sales competitions only have a large e¤ect on sales growth in
stores where the stores manager and a su¢ ciently large fraction of the employees
are of the same gender.
A positive e¤ect of sales contests without nancial rewards may be surprising
to mainstream economics, but strong e¤ects of non-monetary rewards of winning a
contest have been documented before (Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011). This result
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o¤ers a valuable insight to organizations, as there is the potential to motivate em-
ployees without incurring high costs. Some of these possibilities are presented in the
economic analysis of awards (Frey and Neckermann 2008). Second, we contributed
to the literature on gender di¤erences by showing that competition can be equally
stimulating to men and women. Gender di¤erences in competition were also absent
in another eld setting (Lavy 2008). Finally, Chapter 5 reveals an e¤ect of interac-
tion between the gender of a manager and the gender composition of the team. This
interaction may be relevant for promotion tournaments between managers, as the
performance of managers usually depends both on the e¤ort of the team one leads
and on ones own performance. This result suggest that an underrepresentation of
women in the labor market makes it more di¢ cult for female managers to reach top
positions.
6.2 Directions for further research
Chapter 4 shows that co-worker relations su¤er from the introduction of a temporary
team incentive. This result is in line with the predictions of peer pressure theories
and in stark contrast to the hypothesis we put forth in Chapter 2. However, in
Chapter 2 we discuss empirical evidence of a positive relation between team incen-
tives and co-worker relations. In the light of these seemingly contradicting ndings,
there is a need for a unifying framework that identies under which circumstances
we can expect peer pressure or social interaction to prevail. In addition to combin-
ing di¤erent actions into one framework, the analysis can benet from introducing
heterogeneity in workerssocial preferences. Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009, 2011)
make interesting steps in this direction, where di¤erent types of workers sort into
rms o¤ering di¤erent incentive schemes.
Another interesting next step to the analysis in Chapter 2 would be to study
a situation where the employer only observes di¤erences in performance or team
output. In this case, team incentives and relative performance incentives will serve
a dual role of promoting productive e¤ort and stimulating social interaction. In
such situations, it can become optimal for employers to discourage social interaction.
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The team incentive may surpass one of its goals and as a side-e¤ect of strong team
incentives workers may become too concerned with pleasing each other. Likewise,
high rewards in a promotion tournament may lead to excessive social interaction.
In theory, it also seems possible that e¢ cient incentives for e¤ort are reached before
social interaction reaches its rst-best level, in which case the principal still desires
to promote social interaction.
The behavioral assumption we made in Chapter 2, that social interaction a¤ects
altruism (i.e., conditional altruism), can also be applied to Chapter 3. In this case, it
is likely that peer evaluations will have a positive inuence on social interaction be-
tween agents. An agent may want to invest in the relationship with a colleague that
evaluates his performance, so as to increase the likelihood of a positive evaluation
by this colleague. By this logic the e¤ectiveness of peer evaluation may deterio-
rate eventually. Other factors that could undermine the truthful peer evaluation are
competition or collusion between agents that evaluate each other.
The result that a (dis)likability bias in peer evaluation can be overcome by smaller
rewards may be sensitive to the assumption of the binary signal about performance.
In a richer signal space, the trade-o¤ between lying costs and the internalization of
a colleagues utility from the peer evaluation bonus will probably lead to an optimal
bias in the agents evaluation message. My conjecture is that this poses no threat to
the value of peer evaluation for the principal as long as he has complete information
about the agentspreferences, as this allows him to infer how signals translate into
evaluation messages. Otherwise, the principal may want to limit the number of
evaluation messages that agents can send, such that messages provide him with
information about the signal again.
The prediction that incentive e¤ects of peer evaluation decrease with the intensity
of social relations between co-workers is not easily tested in a eld experiment, as one
needs information on workerspreferences. Co-worker relations can be gauged with a
questionnaire, but perhaps more promising is the combination of a eld experiment
with a laboratory experiment to elicit preferences (Falk and Heckman 2009). In this
case, one could assign employees to a peer evaluation treatment, stratied by their
social preferences and inhibitions towards lying.
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In Chapter 4 we nd that team incentives can harm the anti-shirking culture.
This observation is in contrast to earlier ndings, where anti-shirking behavior seems
to be more prevalent in the presence of team incentives (Freeman et al. 2010). We
cannot pin down the mechanism that caused a drop in the willingness to undertake
anti-shirking behavior, as we do not observe behavior during the experiment. Our
interpretation of the results is that attempts to raise group performance by exerting
more peer pressure were ine¤ective, leading to a dissatisfaction with the consequences
of their anti-shirking behavior and worse co-worker relations. However, we cannot
distinguish our interpretation from some alternatives. Anti-shirking behavior may
have become less appreciated in the presence of the team incentive, as colleagues
can suspect that anti-shirking behavior is inspired by greed. Further research on the
mechanisms that drive anti-shirking behavior in the presence of team incentives is
needed.
Chapter 5 makes a contribution to a recent literature on gender di¤erences in
competition. Before I point out some further research ideas, let me provide the
reader with a critical side-note to the gender di¤erences literature. Some scholars
from psychology advocate caution with research on gender di¤erences, or to aban-
don this research completely, as results could be used to perpetuate stereotyping or
justify discrimination and oppression (Baumeister 1988, Eagly 1995). Further, if one
observes gender di¤erences, they may be the result of a mix of other variables such
as social norms, hormones, or physical stature, on which Baumeister states: "All of
these variables are worth study, but studying sex di¤erences is a poor substitute for
studying them, just as studying racial di¤erences is a poor substitute for studying
socioeconomic class, as some sociologists have done." (p. 1094) However, insights
into gender di¤erences, from whatever sociological or biological process they origi-
nate, can potentially o¤er explanations for stylized facts that are otherwise easily
ascribed to discrimination.
Our results suggest that the gender di¤erence in the response to competition
found in laboratory experiments may be absent in the workplace. However, the
possibility exists that the company in which our experiment took place employs
a selection of more competitive women, or men with more feminine tendencies.
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There is a need for more eld experiments on gender di¤erences in competition to
conclude whether the ndings in the lab generalize to the workplace. Further, we
give a tentative explanation for our nding that the e¤ect of competition depends
on interaction between the managers gender and the gender composition of a team:
A manager may be more able to make the tournament appealing to team members
of the same gender. However, an alternative explanation could be that our nding
results from endogenous matching on unobservables, as managers and employees
were not randomized over stores. In case these unobservable characteristics also
inuence the responsiveness to competition, our nding may arise without a causal
link between gender composition and the response to competition. Lab experiments
are arguably the only method that allow for a cleaner replication of this part of
our study, as random assignment of managers and employees to teams is almost
impossible to achieve in the eld, especially in established organizations.
Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Introductie
Veelal bestaat er een belangenconict tussen werknemers en werkgevers over de ho-
eveelheid werk die verricht dient te worden. Dit belangenconict kan leiden tot
een probleem van moral hazardin het geval dat de gevraagde werkzaamheden on-
mogelijk of zeer kostbaar te achterhalen zijn.1 Organisaties moeten ervoor zorgen
dat de werknemer in eigen belang de doelen van de organisatie nastreeft. Een veel
bestudeerde wijze om dit te realiseren is door middel van het inkomen van de werkne-
mer afhankelijk te maken van de uitkomsten; bijv. stukloon, een jaarlijkse bonus
of promotie voor buitengewone prestaties. De positieve invloed van deze nanciële
prikkels op de productiviteit is bewezen in verschillende omgevingen (zie Pendergast
1999 of Lazear en Oyer 2009 voor een overzicht).
Dat nanciële beloningen een belangrijke prikkel kunnen geven zal haast nie-
mand verbazen. Toch is het niet noodzakelijkerwijs de enige, noch de meest e¢ ciënte
manier om medewerkers te motiveren. Intrinsiek waardevol werk (Delfgaauw 2007),
een sociale werksfeer of inspirerend management zijn hooggewaardeerde eigenschap-
pen (Dur 2009). Bovendien is het essentieel om het formele beloningsbeleid en deze
niet-nanciële drijfveren niet in een vacuüm te bestuderen, aangezien er belangrijke
interactie-e¤ecten kunnen optreden. In dit proefschrift wordt bestudeerd hoe nan-
1Moral hazard is een begrip dat wordt gebruikt voor een verandering gedrag wanneer iemand
de consequenties van zijn gedrag niet volledig ondervindt. In de werkplek kan dit bijvoorbeeld
betekenen dat werknemers met een vast loon eerder de kantjes er vanaf proberen te lopen dan
kleine zelfstandigen.
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ciële prikkels invloed hebben op, en beïnvloed worden door de sociale relaties tussen
collegas. Door de economische theorie op deze wijze te verrijken probeer ik meer
inzicht te geven in het gedrag van organisaties en van mensen binnen de organisatie.
Verder geeft dit proefschrift mogelijk bruikbare inzichten voor organisaties in hun
zoektocht naar een optimaal personeelsbeleid.
Dit proefschrift presenteert twee theoretische hoofdstukken en twee hoofdstukken
met de resultaten van veldexperimenten. Ik introduceer een theoretisch onderzoek
naar de interactie-e¤ecten tussen nanciële prikkels en de sociale relaties tussen col-
legas. Hiervoor maak ik gebruik van zogeheten principaal-multi-agentmodellen.
Deze bevatten de strategische interactie tussen werkgever en werknemer en staan
formalisatie van de sociale relaties toe. De voorspellingen over mogelijke interactie-
e¤ecten tussen nanciële prikkels en relaties tussen collegas zijn moeilijk om em-
pirisch aan te tonen, omdat het problematisch is om de causaliteit vast te stellen met
natuurlijke data. Zonder experiment kunnen we bijvoorbeeld geen conclusie trekken
wanneer we een relatie zien tussen de kwaliteit van de relaties tussen collegas en
het gebruik van teambonussen. Een bedrijf zal mogelijk enkel teambonussen intro-
duceren wanneer de relaties goed zijn, maar de teambonus kan er ook voor zorgen
dat de sfeer beter is. Veldexperimenten hebben geen problemen met de causaliteit,
doordat ze gebruik maken van randomizatie. Ik beschrijf de resultaten van twee
veldexperimenten over de e¤ecten van teambonussen.
Onderstaand motiveer ik het belang van relaties tussen collegas en geef ik een
korte toelichting over de voordelen en beperkingen van veldexperimenten. Daarna
sluit ik af met een overzicht van de verschillende hoofdstukken uit dit proefschrift.
Relaties tussen collegas
De meeste organisaties ondernemen acties om de sociale interactie onder collegas te
bevorderen. Voorbeelden hiervan variëren van de inrichting van een ko¢ ekamer tot
de organisatie van een gezamenlijke vakantie. Twee mogelijke redenen om in sociale
relaties op de werkvloer te investeren zijn dat de productiviteit hoger kan worden en
dat werknemers bereid zijn te werken voor een lager loon. Voor een direct e¤ect op
de productiviteit is geen doorslaggevend bewijs, maar goede relaties tussen collegas
zijn wel direct positief gerelateerd aan werktevredenheid en binding met het werk en
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daarnaast negatief aan stress, afwezigheid en verloop (o.a. Price and Mueller 1981,
Riordan and Gri¤eth 1995, Nielsen et al. 2000 en Morrison 2004). Sociale interactie
met collegas is een hooggewaardeerd aspect van het werk voor veel werknemers en
wordt veel gemist onder gepensioneerden (Krueger and Schkade 2009 en Shacklock
2005). Dit vertaalt zich in een negatieve relatie tussen de kwaliteit van de sociale
relaties binnen een organisatie en het niveau van de lonen (Borzaga and Depedri
2005).
Naast een directe investering in sociale interactie op de werkvloer hebben or-
ganisaties een invloed op de werksfeer met de nanciële prikkels die ze werknemers
geven. Werknemers behandelen collegas mogelijk anders wanneer hun inkomen
afhangt van de inspanningen van deze collegas. Bestaande literatuur identiceert
een aantal mogelijke manieren waarop nanciële prikkels de acties jegens collegas
beïnvloeden; een teambonus kan leiden tot meer behulpzaamheid (Fitzroy and Kraft
1986) of tot groepsdruk (Kandel and Lazear 1992) en een promotietoernooi kan lei-
den tot sabotage (Lazear 1989). Dit proefschrift draagt aan deze literatuur bij met
een theoretisch model in hoofdstuk 2 en een veldexperiment in hoofdstuk 4.
Investeringen in de sociale interactie op de werkvloer zijn niet geheel zonder
risico. Enige risicos zijn roddel, verwaarlozing van productieve taken en verstoring
van het beloningsbeleid. Een voorbeeld van dit laatste punt is dat medewerkers
het e¤ect van hun inspanning op het inkomen van een bevriende collega in acht
nemen. Bandiera et al. (2005) liet een productiviteitstijging zien voor een bedrijf
dat relatieve beloningsprikkels verving door een individuele prikkel, deze stijging gold
met name voor werknemers die met meer vrienden samenwerkten. Dit proefschrift
levert een bijdrage op dit vlak in hoofdstuk 3 met een theoretische analyse van een
mogelijk verstorend e¤ect van relaties tussen collegas in peer evaluation, ofwel
collegas die elkaar beoordelen.
Veldexperimenten
Volgens het empirisme komt kennis voort uit ervaring en observatie. Deze opvatting
staat centraal in de beoefening van wetenschap, waar theorieën de empirische weer-
legging moeten doorstaan. Simpele observaties zijn echter niet afdoende om een
hypothese te falsiceren, aangezien men ook de counterfactualmoet waarnemen
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voor doorslaggevend bewijs. Om bijvoorbeeld te kunnen concluderen dat bepaald
beleid een positieve uitwerking heeft op de productiviteit is het niet voldoende om
een stijging van de productiviteit te observeren. Deze stijging kan immers zijn
veroorzaakt door factoren die niet aan het beleid gerelateerd zijn. Idealiter zou men
tegelijkertijd dezelfde werknemers willen observeren in het scenario zonder het beleid,
ofwel de counterfactual. Bij experimenten worden counterfactualsgecreëerd door
middel van een willekeurige toewijzing aan een beleid; medewerkers die niet wor-
den toegewezen vormen de controlegroep en dienen als de counterfactual. Zonder
experiment, ofwel met natuurlijk voorkomende observaties, is het de taak van de
empirische econoom om met behulp van een identicatiemethode counterfactuals
te genereren; bijv. met behulp van instrumentele variabelen of matching. Veldex-
perimenten zijn de meeste recente toevoeging aan het gereedschap van de empirische
econoom. Dit stuk over veldexperimenten pretendeert niet alomvattend te zijn, voor
een uitgebreidere beschouwing van veldexperimenten in arbeidseconomie kan de lezer
List en Rasul (2010) erop naslaan.
Volgens John List, de voorvechter van het veldexperiment in economie, slaan
veldexperimenten een brug tussen experimenten in het laboratorium en natuurlijk
voorkomende data. De interne validiteit, ofwel de geloofwaardigheid, van studies die
natuurlijke data gebruiken is zo goed als de identicatiemethode die gebruikt is. Lab
experimenten staan het toe om direct conclusies te trekken over causale verbanden,
doordat deze gebruik maken van randomisatie. Maar lab experimenten worden ervan
beticht dat ze niet representatief zijn (ofwel een lage externe validiteit hebben),
bijvoorbeeld door kleine belangen, een kunstmatige omgeving, of de aanwezigheid
van iemand die het experiment afneemt. Een natuurlijk veldexperiment combineert
de voordelen van randomisatie en realiteit.2
Uiteraard zijn veldexperimenten geen wondermiddel. Wanneer de stap van het
lab naar het veld wordt gemaakt gaat dat ten koste van de algehele controle over
de omgeving. Daarnaast blijven er vraagtekens bestaan bij de externe validiteit,
aangezien de resultaten speciek kunnen zijn voor lokale omstandigheden. Zelfs
2Een natuurlijk experiment wordt gedenieerd als een experiment waarbij de deelnemers in
hun natuurlijke omgeving acteren en er niet van op de hoogte zijn dat er een experiment gaande
is (Harrison en List 2004).
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wanneer de resultaten van een klein veldexperiment niet locatie speciek zijn, dan
generaliseren ze niet automatisch door mogelijke evenwichtse¤ecten. Neem bijvoor-
beeld een experiment dat laat zien dat een bedrijf productievere werknemers aantrekt
wanneer het prestatiebeloning invoert; dit resultaat kan onmogelijk opgaan wanneer
alle bedrijven dit doen. De meeste discussies over de voordelen en beperkingen van
veldexperimenten sluiten af door te zeggen dat ze bestaande methodes aanvullen.
Tenslotte is er een aantal gevaren waar wetenschappers op bedacht moeten zijn
ongeacht de empirische methode. Een eerste gevaar is de sample selection bias,
wat wil zeggen dat de bestudeerde steekproef zodanig verschilt van de populatie
dat de resultaten worden beïnvloed. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 en 5 zijn mo-
gelijk ook onderhevig aan de invloed van zelfselectie. De veldexperimenten vonden
namelijk plaats in één van de 15 bedrijven die we hebben benaderd. Daardoor is
het mogelijk dat dit bedrijf specieke eigenschappen heeft, zoals een management
dat openstaat voor experimenten, die de resultaten kunnen beinvloeden. De invloed
van zelfselectie is niet enkel van toepassing op de experimentele methode, natuurlijk
voorkomende data kunnen dit probleem ook ondervinden. Banerjee en Duo (2009)
geven als voorbeeld dat grote projecten politiek gevoeliger liggen om te evalueren
aangezien deze vaak goed gepubliceerd worden; daardoor kan er zelfselectie ontstaan
met betrekking tot welke projecten geëvalueerd mogen worden.
Een tweede gevaar is de publicatie bias. Er ontstaat een vertekening wanneer
de kans op publicatie afhangt van de statistische signicantie van resultaten.3 Het
achterwege blijven van nulresultaten wordt ook wel het ladekast probleemgenoemd,
waar studies zonder signicante resultaten bij wijze van beeldspraak in de ladekast
verdwijnen (Rosenthal 1979). Volgens Rosenthal wordt dit probleem opgelost door
replicatie, aangezien er een ongeloofwaardig grote ladekast moet zijn om de resul-
taten te ontkrachten. Toch is er mogelijk een probleem wanneer we de keuzevrijheid
van onderzoekers m.b.t. controle variabelen combineren met een door theorie geïn-
spireerd vermoeden. Card en Krueger (1995) laten zien dat de literatuur over het
3Er zijn goede redenen voor tijdschriften om de voorkeur te geven aan studies met statistisch
signicante resultaten, aangezien de onderzoeksmethode of data mogelijk van hogere kwaliteit zijn.
Met de publicatie biaswordt echter bedoeld dat de voorkeur wordt gegeven aan studies met statis-
tisch signicante resultaten boven studies met nulresultaten van vergelijkbare onderzoekskwaliteit.
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e¤ect van minimumlonen op de werkgelegenheid mogelijk lijdt onder de publicatie
bias. Hun meta-analyse toont aan dat het geschatte e¤ect tweemaal zo groot is als
de standaard fout, onafhankelijk van de grootte van het e¤ect, en dat de t-waarden
niet toenemen met de wortel van het aantal observaties. In andere woorden wordt er
door alle studies slechts voldaan aan de minimale eisen van statistische signicantie,
terwijl de statistische signicantie zou moeten toenemen met het aantal observaties.
Tenslotte is de publicatie bias niet beperkt tot de voorkeur voor signicante resul-
taten. Replicatie studies hebben meer moeite om in toonaangevende bladen te pub-
liceren, ondanks mogelijke signicantie van de resultaten. Dit probleem is mogelijk
ernstiger voor experimenten. Zoals Rodrik (2009) stelt dat ironisch genoeg studies
met een lagere interne validiteit een grotere prikkel tot replicatie geven onder de
naam van verbeterde identicatie.
Overzicht van het proefschrift
Financiële prikkels en sociale interactie
In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen we de mogelijkheid om sociale interactie tussen collegas
te bevorderen met behulp van nanciële prikkels voor productieve taken. In het
principaal-agent model dat we bestuderen kiezen werknemers niet alleen productieve
acties, maar ook de sociale interactie met collegas. Sociale interactie is gemodelleerd
als een uitruil van aandacht, waar het geven van aandacht kostbaar is. Het krijgen
van aandacht is plezierig en beïnvloedt de sociale preferenties. Werknemers zijn con-
ditioneel altruïstisch, ofwel altruïsme richting een collega neemt toe in de ontvangst
van aandacht. De private kosten en externe baten zorgen ervoor dat werknemers te
weinig aandacht aan elkaar geven.
Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de manager de sociale interactie kan bevorderen met
een teambonus of relatieve prestatiebeloning. Deze externaliteit in een werknemer
zijn loon zorgt ervoor dat er de wens is om de inspanningen van een collega te
beïnvloeden. De strategische reden om aandacht aan een collega te geven werkt als
volgt: Het geven van aandacht leidt tot een reciproke reactie, aangezien collegas
conditioneel altruïstisch zijn. De altruïstische collega internaliseert het e¤ect van
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zijn inspanning deels en past daarmee zijn inspanning in de gewenste richting aan,
als reactie op de ontvangen aandacht. De manager creëert doelbewust een exter-
naliteit van inspanning om het probleem van de aandachts-externaliteit op te lossen.
Uiteindelijk herstelt de manager de prikkels voor productieve inspanning. Hij geeft
zwakkere individuele prikkels in combinatie met een teambonus, terwijl relatieve
prestatiebeloning gecompeseerd wordt met sterkere individuele prikkels.
De analyse in hoofdstuk 2 leidt tot andere voorspellingen dan de bestaande
literatuur. Hoofdstuk 2 voorspelt dat, onder de veronderstelling van condition-
eel altruïstische of reciproke werknemers, een teambonus alsook relatieve presta-
tiebeloning leiden tot meer sociale interactie en betere relaties tussen collegas. Als
tegenpool voorspellen theorieën van groepsdruk in teams en sabotage in promotieto-
ernooien slechtere relaties bij deze nanciële prikkels (bijv. Kandel en Lazear 1992
en Lazear 1989). Theorieën van behulpzaamheid in teams of theorieën die uitgaan
van een aversie tegen ongelijkheid voorspellen ook betere relaties bij een teambonus,
maar enkel als er complementariteit in de productie bestaat of wanneer de team-
bonus leidt tot meer inkomensgelijkheid (bijv. FitzRoy en Kraft 1986 en Bartling
2011). Naast de voorspelling dat teambonussen en relatieve prestatiebeloning leiden
tot betere relaties tussen collegas heeft de analyse nog een andere beleidsimplicatie:
Namelijk, dat sociale relaties van belang zijn voor het e¤ect van nanciële prikkels.
Een teambonus geeft mogelijk te sterke prikkels, terwijl de prikkels te zwak zijn bij
relatieve prestatiebeloning wanneer de sociale setting genegeerd wordt.
Beoordelingen door collegas en sociale relaties
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt bestudeerd hoe bestaande relaties tussen collegas invloed kun-
nen hebben op een optimale inzet van nanciële prikkels. Ik bekijk een setting waar
twee collegas betere informatie hebben over de prestaties van elkaar dan dat man-
ager heeft. In het model betekent dit dat collegas een signaal ontvangen over de
inspanningen van de ander, terwijl de manager enkel de productie van het team
observeert. De manager vraagt de werknemers om hun collega te beoordelen in de
hoop hiermee een sterkere prikkel te geven dan met een teambonus. De teambonus
is ine¢ ciënt doordat werknemers deels willen meeliften op de inspanningen van hun
collega. Ik begin de analyse vanuit ideale omstandigheden voor peer evaluation. Ik
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veronderstel dat het voor werknemers kostbaar is om te liegen over het ontvangen sig-
naal. In dit geval is een bonus voor het ontvangen van een positieve beoordeling even
stimulerend als een individuele nanciële prikkel zou zijn. Een eerlijke beoordeling
geeft werknemers een prikkel tot inspanning, aangezien ze de kans willen verhogen
dat de collega een positief signaal krijgt en daardoor een positieve beoordeling geeft.
Vervolgens introduceer ik relaties tussen collegas. Deze hebben mogelijk een
verstorend e¤ect op de beoordelingen. Werknemers maken nu een afweging tussen
hun kosten van liegen en het ontleende nut van de bonus voor een (on)geliefde
collega. Lage kosten van liegen, sterke sociale relaties, of grote bonussen voor een
positieve beoordeling leiden er toe dat vrienden elkaar positief beoordelen ongeacht
het signaal dat ze krijgen, terwijl vijanden elkaar de bonus altijd misgunnen. Door
de bonus te verlagen kan de manager er voor zorgen dat de beoordelingen een eerlijke
weerspiegeling van het signaal blijven. Desalniettemin, biedt de manager altijd een
dergelijke bonus aan in het optimale contract. De manager vult deze enkel aan met
een teambonus wanneer de sociale relaties de bonus voor een positieve beoordeling
erg beperken.
Het resultaat dat relaties tussen collegas, zowel goed als slecht, de bonus voor een
positieve beoordeling beperken leidt tot een testbare hypothese: Peer evaluation
wordt minder e¤ectief naarmate relaties tussen collegas sterker worden. Daarnaast
heeft dit resultaat een directe beleidsimplicatie voor managers: Managers moeten
werknemers die relatief onverschillig tegenover elkaar staan elkaars prestaties laten
beoordelen. Verder draagt hoofdstuk 3 bij aan een discussie binnen de management
literatuur over de vraag of peer evaluationgebruikt kan worden voor het bepalen
van prestatiebeloning of dat het enkel voor educatieve doeleinden gebruikt kan wor-
den (Edwards en Ewen 1996). Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat sociale relaties tussen
collegas geen bezwaar vormen wanneer er een kleine bonus wordt gegeven. Boven-
dien laat het hoofdstuk zien dat er zelfs een prikkel uitgaat van beoordelingen die
het signaal negeren. Dit komt doordat werknemers de kosten van liegen van een
(on)geliefde collega kunnen beïnvloedden. Als voorbeeld kan gedacht worden aan
vrienden die harder gaan werken omdat ze elkaar niet in de moeilijke positie willen
brengen dat ze moeten liegen over elkaar prestaties.
125
In de hoofdstuk 4 en 5 worden de resultaten van twee veldexperimenten beschreven.
Beide veldexperimenten vonden plaats in een Nederlandse winkelketen van 128
winkels. De winkels verkopen kleding en schoenen onder één merknaam. Het man-
agement was van plan om nanciële prikkels te introduceren voor het verkopend per-
soneel, die in tegenstelling tot liaalmanagers enkel een vast loon verdienden. Beide
experimenten introduceerden een teambonus voor alle medewerkers in het liaal bij
verbeterde prestaties over een tijdspanne van zes weken. Het verkopend personeel
en de liaalmanagers waren niet op de hoogte van de samenwerking met de Erasmus
Universiteit, wat deze experimenten classiceert als natuurlijke veldexperimenten.
Teambonussen en acties tegenover lakse collegas
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de aanleidingen voor, en consequenties van anti-shirking
gedrag; ofwel acties die werknemers ondernemen wanneer ze een collega minder hard
zien werken dan dat hij of zou moeten. Het hoofdstuk presenteert de resultaten van
een experiment, waar alle medewerkers binnen een liaal een bonus konden verdienen
door het gemiddelde aantal producten per kassabon op winkelniveau voldoende te
verhogen. Onze hypothese was dat anti-shirking gedrag zowel een e¤ect kon hebben
op de werking van de teambonus als door de teambonus beïnvloed kon worden.
Vandaar dat we zowel voor als na het experiment een enquête hebben afgenomen
om een indicatie van anti-shirking gedrag te krijgen.
De teambonus heeft niet tot extra verkopen tijdens het experiment geleid. Wel
laat het hoofdstuk zien dat de teambonus een negatief e¤ect heeft gehad op de
bereidheid om anti-shirking gedrag te ondernemen door middel van een analyse van
de verschillen tussen controlegroep lialenen teambonus lialenin de verschillen
tussen beide enquêtes. We menen dat deze daling in de bereidheid voortkomt uit een
ontevredenheid met mislukte pogingen om collegas harder te laten werken door druk
uit te oefenen. Als aanwijzingen voor deze uitleg vinden we een signicant e¤ect van
de teambonus op de beantwoording van twee stellingen; in teambonus lialenwerd
vaker de collega nam het mij kwalijken minder vaak de collega in kwestie verbe-
terde zijn gedraggeantwoord. Daarnaast vinden we dat de relaties tussen collegas
hebben geleden onder de teambonus. We ontkrachten de alternatieve verklaring dat
er sprake zou zijn van een algemene ontevredenheid in het beantwoorden van de
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tweede enquête voor teambonus lialen, doordat we laten zien dat de relaties met
de manager en werktevredenheid niet zijn afgenomen door de teambonus.
Onze analyse levert een vooruitgang op Freeman et al. (2010) door gebruik te
maken van onze experimentele opzet en doordat we anti-shirking gedrag kunnen
relateren aan een harde prestatiemaatstaf. In eerdere studies is laten zien dat het
goed voor de productiviteit kan zijn wanneer werknemers door hun collegas worden
geobserveerd (Mas en Moretti 2009 en Falk en Ichino 2006): Om goede presta-
ties te leveren is het belangrijk een sterke anti-shirking cultuur te creëren en te
behouden. Een manier waarmee organisaties mogelijk een invloed hebben op anti-
shirking gedrag is door aandacht van het management, aangezien hoofdstuk 4 laat
zien dat de relaties tussen een manager en medewerkers positief gerelateerd zijn aan
anti-shirking gedrag. Onze observatie dat een teambonus een negatieve uitwerking
kan hebben op de anti-shirking cultuur is tegenspraak met Freeman et al. (2010).
Competitie en verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen
Het veldexperiment in hoofdstuk 5 introduceert verkoopwedstrijden tussen groepjes
van vijf lialen. In de eerste experimentele manipulatie is er een teambonus voor het
winnende liaal en de tweede plek. Terwijl er bij de tweede manipulatie slechts om de
eer gestreden wordt. Filialen in beide type verkoopwedstrijden behaalden signicant
hogere verkoopresultaten in vergelijking met de controle groep. We vinden geen
verschil tussen beide type verkoopwedstrijden. Onze bevindingen sluiten aan bij
recente literatuur. Azmat en Iriberri (2010) en Blanes i Vidal en Nossol (2009)
laten zien dat mensen harder werken wanneer ze feedback krijgen over relatieve
prestaties en Kosfeld en Neckermann (2011) toont aan dat een competitie met enkel
een symbolische prijs ook stimulerend werkt.
Daarnaast draagt hoofdstuk 5 bij aan de literatuur over verschillen tussen man-
nen en vrouwen in competitie. Gneezy et al. (2003) liet zien dat vrouwen minder
geprikkeld worden door competitie dan mannen, waarna verschillende lab experi-
menten deze bevinding repliceerden. Dit verschil zou een ondervertegenwoordiging
van vrouwen aan de top mede kunnen verklaren, omdat er verschillende promotieto-
ernooien gewonnen moeten worden voor topposities. In tegenstelling tot Gneezy et
al. vinden wij dat het geslacht van de liaalmanager of het percentage vrouwen in
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de winkel niet uitmaakt voor het e¤ect van de competitie. Hiermee presenteren we
het tweede veldexperiment dat geen verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen vindt in
de stimulerende werking van competitie (Lavy 2008 laat dit zien voor leraren). Dit
roept de vraag op of de bevindingen van het lab naar de werkplek generaliseren.
Tenslotte vinden we dat het positieve e¤ect van competitie afhangt van een
interactie tussen het geslacht van de liaalmanager en het percentage vrouwen in
de winkel. Het stimulerende e¤ect is enkel aanwezig wanneer er een voldoende
percentage medewerkers het zelfde geslacht heeft als de liaalmanager. Dit resultaat
is interessant omdat in de competitie voor topposities, prestaties niet enkel afhangen
van de eigen inspanningen van een manager, maar ook van de prestaties van het team
dat hij of zij leidt. Wanneer vrouwen ondervertegenwoordigd zijn in de arbeidsmarkt
dan is het volgens onze bevindingen moeilijker voor vrouwelijke managers om de top
te bereiken.
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